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ABSTRACT 
In May 2016, the German government approved an about-face in its military 
personnel policy by lifting personnel caps. This measure allowed the Bundeswehr to 
increase its operational power, strengthen its robustness, and establish new capabilities as 
part of a comprehensive $150 billion military build-up program—the first since the late 
Cold War. Germany cut its close ties to Russia and subscribed to the European 
skepticism about Moscow. 
This latest reform, with a new personnel policy at its very core, also represents 
Germany’s coming of age in terms of security and defense policy. The sheer fact that 
none of the NATO-allied member states objected to this military expansion emphasizes 
the level of trust that Germany has attained by serving as a reliable—albeit sometimes 
reluctant—and predictable partner. 
To provide the theoretical background necessary, the research begins with an 
overview on the transformation of military organizations in general based on 
organizational theory. Then, a brief historic overview traces the determinants that have 
shaped Germany’s role and behavior in defense and security policy since 
World War II. It highlights Germany’s historical obligation to ensure peace and security 
with a military uniquely bound to democratic principles. Furthermore, this thesis aims 
to prove that the recent “Turnaround of the Bundeswehr” is actually an evolutionary 
phase of the prior reform. 
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The parameters of security policy have changed drastically for Germany since 
2012 from the blue skies of enduring peace to the dark horizon of crisis. The arc of 
disorder from Crimea to Syria and Mali, with corresponding mass migration, threats of 
international terrorism, unconventional and hybrid warfare, and cyber-attacks have thrust 
themselves on political Berlin. Since the advent of national unity and the Two Plus Four 
imperative to reduce in force the two German armies in 1989–94, the German military 
has consistently reduced its personnel over the last 25 years. After the end of the Cold 
War, national unity and the end of confrontation in central Europe allowed for a 
sweeping cutback of forces. Thus, a united Germany felt ready for peace dividends and to 
slash its number of soldiers from around 585,0001 at the time of the German reunification 
to 177,000 in 2016.2  
In light of the worsening shift in the post-2014 security policy situation, the 
German military now faces a huge gap between the resulting demands on the armed 
forces and the resources available. Therefore, in May 2016, the German government 
approved an about-face in the military personnel policy, lifting personnel caps. This 
about-face allowed the Bundeswehr, for example, to increase its operational power 
beyond the expeditionary missions of the so-called deployment phase of the 1990s, to 
strengthen its robustness, and to establish new capabilities. It is important to view this 
pivot in light of Germany´s historical obligation to ensure peace and security in Europe 
amid the domestic political environment created by a government of two traditionally 
competing parties (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) and tied together by a 
coalition agreement. As part of a comprehensive €130 billion ($153 billion) program of 
military build-up, this turnaround actually has teeth. 
                                                 
1 Including the Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army) of the former German Democratic 
Republic. 
2 Vince Chadwick and Cynthia Kroet, “Germany Plans Military Expansion after Decades of 
Downsizing,” Politico.EU, October 5, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-plans-military-
expansion-after-decades-of-downsizing-defence-army/. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What has been Germany’s rationale in the realms of the international system, 
domestic politics, and the German military as an organization for initiating a military 
expansion after the European geopolitical upheaval of 2014? The decision to lift 
personnel caps allowed the Bundeswehr to increase its sustainability, strengthen its 
robustness, and establish new capabilities. Thereby, Germany significantly changed its 
foreign and security policies despite being, at least in the minds of some on the left and 
elsewhere, a (now) reputedly pacifist nation surrounded by friends.  
Pointing to Germany´s historical obligation to uphold human rights and European 
security at the same time, what are the detailed political origins of this strategic 
revolution? Or can it be said to be more of an evolutionary process when viewed against 
the story of German arms and policy over a longer span of time, especially in the phases 
of reorganization and transformation of the armed forces since 1989?   
This thesis analyzes the main political reasons in their variety and the significant 
milestones in what has been a confusing process, the results of which have been a turning 
point in Germany’s record in Europe in the 20th and 21st centuries. This study considers 
such significant factors as domestic limitations and German civil-military relations, with 
a special focus on the organizational decisions that shaped and are shaping a new 
Bundeswehr.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
From a German perspective, the contemporary European security architecture has 
been crucially determined by two pivotal points in European history. The first is the 
enduring position of Germany at the center of Europe and how the European and then 
Atlantic security system has adjusted to this center of gravity in the international system. 
After two world wars intended to assure Germany a command over the continent and 
beyond, a defeated Germany was divided under Allied occupation “to prevent Germany 
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from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.”3 The Cold War soon led to 
national division and a new system of bipolar confrontation with each German state 
armed against the other. It meant two new armies from the wreckage of the defeated 
Wehrmacht and the integration of the two German states in the respective collective 
defense systems: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact. 
The effect of this process on German arms was the military structure of the Cold War, 
with a high level of armament in central Europe, a burden that was thankfully cast aside 
after 1990.  
The second pivotal point was marked by the end of the Cold War and the 
consequent reunification of Germany, regaining its sovereignty and finally striving for its 
rightful peace dividend. The shape and strength of the Bundeswehr was deeply 
influenced by these forces. 
The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany4 was considered to 
be a great gift to—and by—the German people sick of defeat in war and the burden of 
armies in national life. Therefore, by the 1960s, Germany, with its location in the center 
of Europe, once more came to see itself as a bridge between the West and the East, 
particularly Russia. It is arguable, however, that the Ukraine crisis in 2014along with 
the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-engineered insurgency in Eastern 
Ukrainehave led to a fundamental realignment of German security policy, especially 
with respect to Russia. This realignment not only put an end to the period of a reduced 
German military and thereby the peace dividend, but also to Germany’s self-imposed 
restrictions on military commitments and its willingness to finally accept greater 
responsibility in an “out-of-joint” world.  
Identifying the driving factors of military reforms in general and in the 
aforementioned case of the Bundeswehr in particular is essential to understand the future 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces 
(JCS 1067) (April 1945), in United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in 
Documents (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 2, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2297.   
4 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany: Moscow, 12 September 1990 (London: HMSO, 1991). 
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role of the Bundeswehr as political/security/strategic instrument of choice in conflict, 
crisis, and national as well as collective defense. An understanding of the parameters and 
political aims of the reform at a national and international level can contribute to 
reinforce its transatlantic and European allies’ trust and confidence in Germany as a 
reliable partner. An understanding of this process is also essential for an author actively 
engaged in the further evolution of the German military amid domestic political upheaval 
and an unsettled international system. As an aspect of U.S. security policy, such a study 
is also of use to those Americans with an enduring interest in politics in Central Europe 
given Germany’s ever central role in the fate of the continent. An analysis of the 
redefined Bundeswehr’s organization, its objectives, and priorities also helps to predict 
future developments in European security and defense policy and impacts on its 
relationship to the NATO alliance and Germany’s most crucial ally—the United States. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
While reforms of organizations such as armed forces are often triggered by single 
events with tremendous impact—ahead of looming wars, or after major political 
changes—the German expansion that was initiated in 2016 clearly eludes a simple, 
monocausal explanation. The reason behind this assertion is not the absence of a specific 
trigger event, as this thesis will show by proving that the continued Russian aggression in 
the Ukraine since early 2014 has led to an unfolding of a third pivotal point in the recent 
history of contemporary European security architecture. Rather to a greater degree, it was 
the final push necessary in the realms of international and domestic politics to kick off 
the process of increasing the number of soldiers instead of reducing it for the first time 
since the late Cold War. Moreover, this about-face has occurred contrary to party 
political expectations used to the historical behavior of the German armed forces. 
Thus, it seems that a multiplicity of specific factors has made it possible for the 
highly improbable to become reality—the expansion the German armed forces not only 
without objection by its European neighbors, but with applause from their fellow NATO 
partners who now welcome a commanding role for Germany in a Europe struggling to 
retain its hard-won unity. It required a European crisis to overcome the reluctance of 
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Germany’s neighbors to tolerate a German military expansion—and Putin delivered it in 
the Crimea.  
The crucial part, however, was to overcome the “reform fatigue” of the 
Bundeswehr itself to transform again after it had suffered from so many reforms and 
“reforms of reforms” since 1990, and especially since the year 2000.  
The German military turnaround in 2016 is neither an empty promise, nor just an 
adjustment of the 2010 reorientation. Rather, it is a new chapter in German military 
history, and therefore, its ramifications on international defense and security policy 
demand further analysis and explanation. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study focuses primarily on resources publicly available as well as on the 
literature by contemporary scholars and media coverage to explain Germany’s rationale 
for initiating a military expansion in 2016. 
To provide the theoretical background necessary, it is appropriate to start with an 
overview on the transformation of military organizations in general based on 
organizational theory. Then, a brief historic overview is offered on the determinants that 
have shaped and characterized Germany’s role and behavior in terms of defense and 
security policy since World War II, to understand Germany´s historical obligation to 
ensure peace and security with a military that is uniquely bound to democratic principles. 
Therefore, this study employs mainly government-produced and -provided historic 
documents from such figures as John Lewis Gaddis5 and Donald Abenheim6 as well as 
from leading actors in the saga (i.e., [retired] General Schönbohm).7 Special care is taken 
                                                 
5 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, Reprint ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2006). 
6 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, 
Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-American Essays on Civil-Military Relations (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2017). 
7 Jörg Schönbohm, Two Armies and One Fatherland : The End of the Nationale Volksarmee 
(Providence, RI: Berghahn Books1996). 
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to discuss existing studies from NATO and think tanks like the German Council on 
Foreign Relations and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
At the very core of this thesis is the case of the “Reorientation of the 
Bundeswehr.”  The examination of this case enables one to determine whether the current 
pivot to a military expansion is only an adjustment to the previous reform of the 
Bundeswehr or in fact—as this thesis intends to prove—an evolutionary phase of the 
prior reform, although it cannot be referred to as such due to domestic constraints from 
the latest coalition agreement of 2013.8 While relevant literature to date is hardly 
plentiful, an evaluation of the reorientation by Joachim Jens Hesse,9 the report of the 
commission for the future of the Bundeswehr,10 and the report of the Bundeswehr 
structure commission11 prove especially valuable in defining organizational principles, 
characteristics, and cornerstones of military reforms in general and the Bundeswehr’s 
latest one particularly. Additionally, the publicly available organizational founding 
documents like the “Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and 
                                                 
8 The 2013 coalition agreement committed to leading the successful reorientation of the Bundeswehr; 
there was no option for readjustments or even a change of course, if required. cf. CDU, CSU, and SPD, 
“Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten—Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und SPD [Shaping Germany’s 
Future—Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD]” (Union Betriebs-GmbH, December 16, 
2013), https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf. 
9 Joachim Jens Hesse, Die Neuausrichtung Der Bundeswehr: Ansatz, Umsetzung Und Ergebnisse Im 
Nationalen Und Internationalen Vergleich [The Reorientation of the Bundeswehr. Idea, Implementation 
and Outcome in a National and International Comparison] (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Mbh & Co, 2015). 
10 Kommission, “Gemeinsame Sicherheit Und Zukunft Der Bundeswehr—Bericht Der Kommission 
an Die Bundesregierung [Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr—Report of the Commission to 
the Federal Government]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung Presse- und Informationsstab Referat 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, May 2000). 
11 Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, “Bericht Der Strukturkommission Der Bundeswehr—Vom 
Einsatz Her Denken, Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz [Report of the Structural Commission—Focus 
on Operations—Concentration, Flexibility, Efficiency]” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung—Presse- 
und Informationsstab AB 2, October 2010). 
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Command and Control Organization in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the 
Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree—cf. appendix)”12 is evaluated.  
Furthermore, because these developments are overshadowed by Germany’s 
history and the Bundeswehr’s burden of its heritage, a second level of analysis is applied 
by adding a historical perspective to the argument, where appropriate. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter I defines the major research question 
and provides the context, main hypothesis, and the research design.  
Chapter II consists of two parts laying the foundation of this work’s argument. 
While the first part provides the fundamentals of the transformation of military 
organizations in general as well as the German case in particular, the second part 
examines the Bundeswehr’s historic roots in Europe and its heritage to illuminate the 
constraints under which the Bundeswehr has operated since its very beginning. 
Moreover, the implications of German unification and the integration of the former 
National People’s Army are discussed to the extent that they have influenced 
organizational decisions. 
Chapter III sets a clear focus on the so-called Reorientation of 2010 as the most 
comprehensive German military structural reform since the end of the Cold War by 
portraying its driving factors, key philosophy, organizational outcomes, and approach to 
modernizing the forces as well as their administrative body. 
Chapter IV concentrates on a “world out of joint” from a German perspective by 
addressing the crisis of its Ostpolitik as a driving factor Germany’s latest reform and 
military expansion. Chapter IV also discusses Germany’s “special relationship” with 
Russia, from the beginning of the Cold War to West Germany’s rapprochement, and 
                                                 
12 Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze Für Die Spitzengliederung, Und 
Führungsorganisation Im Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung Und Der Bundeswehr (Dresdner Erlass) 
[Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and Command and Control Organisation in 
the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)]” (Bundesministerium der 




finally to the post-Cold War era, with Germany becoming a bridge between western 
Europe and Russia. With Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-puppeteered 
insurgency in eastern Ukraine, the tragedy of the failure of Germany’s policy of détente 
had become painfully visible. Therefore, the paradigm shift in German foreign policy is 
evaluated, and the consequences of this change and NATO’s role in that process are 
addressed. 
Moreover, organizational decisions of the Bundeswehr and the curse of a 
tendency to constantly reform its reforms are debated. In order to determine the scope of 
the current German military pivot with a new military personnel policy at its very core it 
must be compared to the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr—its last official 
reform in 2010. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings and identifies implications for Germany’s role 
in shaping the future of the European Union’s and transatlantic security architecture. 
Additionally, the entanglement of Germany’s expansion with the question of prospects 
for a future European Army is addressed. 
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II. TRANSFORMATION AND THE CASE OF 
THE BUNDESWEHR 
Identifying the driving factors of military reforms in general and the case of the 
Bundeswehr in particular is essential to understand the future role of the Bundeswehr as a 
political instrument of choice in conflicts, crises, and contingencies of national as well as 
collective defense. 
Despite often being regarded as a stronghold of conservativism, armed forces 
throughout history have constantly been reformed, realigned, or reorganized in order to 
adjust to a changing strategic and operational environment as well as to improve their 
effectiveness and efficiency. The terms revolution, reform, reorganization, and 
realignment have often been exchanged for one another as their respective connotations 
have changed over time. The need for progress, innovation, and adaption, however, have 
remained constant, at least from the advent of modern armies in the 17th century when 
the epoch of wars of mercenaries gave way to wars of standing armies up to today.  
A. MILITARY CHANGE—A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
With the beginning of the new millennium, the term “military transformation” 
replaced “revolution in military affairs,” which has been used since the 1980s.13 In 2001, 
then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared transformation to be “at the 
heart” of the “new strategic approach” in order to be “prepared to meet emerging 
challenges.”14 This shift in terminology has been adopted by politicians, military 
professionals, and scholars ever since. And it has gone global: “Transformation” has 
become a transnational process with almost equivalent trajectories. 
                                                 
13 Theo Farrell, Terriff Terry, and Osinga Frans, eds., A Transformation Gap?: American Innovations 
and European Military Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 2–3. 
14 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” September 30, 2001, 16, 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 
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1. The Military Organization as Open System 
To analyze the transformation processes of military organizations in general, 
organization theory offers a useful level of abstraction for describing and explaining the 
related subsystems, their interrelationships, and their response to external influences. 
William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell offer a stunningly parsimonious approach by 
defining an organization as “a system of coordinated activities of a group of people 
working cooperatively towards a common goal under authority and leadership.”15 An 
entity that features all these attributes therefore can be characterized as an organization, 
whether it is business, private or public, or an entity created by the government. 
According to classical organization theories, organizations are all the same—with only 
minor differences between a restaurant, an automobile factory, or a Department of 
Defense.16 Although certainly distinct from each other in size, appearance, and purpose, 
all these entities can be analyzed according to dimensions of strategy, culture, structure, 
and their processes. Weber’s classic characteristics of bureaucracy have dominated the 
organization’s structure as it dominated organizational theory and its image of formal 
organizations.17  
Military organizations have often been seen and treated as the most formal public 
organizations, calling for rules and regulations to ensure uniformity in structure and 
agency. When the world entered the Information age, which led to an evolution of new 
technologies, organizations as well as organization theorists shifted their focus to the 
professionalization now needed to perform in these highly specified fields of knowledge. 
Frederick C. Mosher, who did intensive research on the emerging professionalism in the 
public sector, identified numerous agencies that had been taken over by this development, 
as shown in Table 1: 
                                                 
15 William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell, Organization Theory (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1976), 29. 
16 Florence Heffron, Organization Theory & Public Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pearson, 
1989), 2–11. 
17 Heffron, 4–6. 
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Table 1.   Professionalization in Public Service18 
Federal 
Professionally dominated agencies Agents 
Military agencies 
Department of State 
Public Health Service 
Bureau of Reclamation 
Geological Survey 
Department of Justice 
Department of Education 
Bureau of Standards 
Military officers 







State and Local 
Professionally dominated agencies Agents 
Highways 
Welfare agencies 
Mental hygiene agencies 
Public health agencies 
Education and schools 
Higher education institutions 









At first glance, Mosher’s list merely suggests, that military organizations have 
become dominated by professionalism—a statement hardly anyone involved in defense 
and security policy would ever deny. On second glance, however, one realizes that 
modern militaries comprise all the listed professions in Table 1, since military 
organizations can best be described as a complex system of systems. Military 
organizations—as the German Bundeswehr for instance—incorporate different highly 
specialized branches of services with officers, engineers, doctors, geologists, police 
officers, aviators, lawyers, and more. An organization like the Bundeswehr nowadays 
                                                 
18 Adapted from Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 115. 
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runs its own universities, hospitals, schools, jurisdiction, defense scientific institutes, 
andin essenceits own airline, shipping, and transport companies. 
While there seem to be as many organization theories out there as there are 
organizations, open systems theory is the most commonly acknowledged one to explain 
complex (meta-) structures. With a system being “a set of units with relationships among 
them and the totality of the system [being] greater than the sum of its parts,”19 open 
systems theory concentrates on explaining an organization’s relationship with its 
respective environment and the resulting dynamic interdependencies.  
In open systems, the “environment emerges as the crucial variable for 
organizational survival.”20 What better theory could there be for explaining a military 
organization, which exists only for the sole purpose to ensure the security and thus the 
survival of a nation? Furthermore, open systems theory encourages recognition of the 
small but sometimes decisive differences between all the same organizations, especially 
when it comes to public versus private and draws attention to the “dichotomy between 
politics and administration,”21 each following different rules and regularities. Since, 
according to Clausewitz’s famous phrase, “war is the continuation of politics by other 
means,”22 it seems paramount to discuss in more detail the impact of policy and politics 
on military organization as an instrument of war.23 
2. Transition in Changing Environments 
In a rapidly changing world, nations often feel the increasing need to transform 
their militaries. While the reasons to transform may differ in their composition and 
absolute necessity, a few basic patterns can be observed. Essentially, a nation’s military 
                                                 
19 Heffron, Organization Theory & Public Organizations, 8. 
20 Heffron, 9. 
21 Heffron, 12. 
22 Edward Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters: 
U.S. Army War College Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1995): 14. 
23 In “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Villacres and Bassford note that “this oft-quoted 
sentence contains two very different messages because of the dual meaning of the German word he 
[Clausewitz] used: Politik. That one word encompasses the two quite different English words policy and 
politics.” 
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transformation is triggered either externally by a change in the political or security 
landscape, or internally by social changes and their possible effects on civil-military 
relations.  
In terms of security policy, the change of perceived or real threats and risks, the 
behavior of competing states, geo-political shifts, or the interaction within alliances and 
coalitions can call for structural transformation. On the domestic side, demography, 
social-cultural transition (e.g., pacifism or post-heroism24), and public attitude toward the 
use of (military) power influence the decisions shaping a state’s armed forces. Each 
country’s individual level of ambition, its military objectives, and self-image as well as 
the chosen system of military service (conscription versus all volunteer forces) add to the 
picture.  
Although economic aspects such as the budget available, the willingness to invest 
in military assets and personnel, or the option to focus on public-private partnerships 
affect the organization of the armed forces as well, these decisions are also part of the 
political sphere. Thus, it can be concluded that the transformation of military forces is 
solely rooted in political framework conditions, as far as foreign or domestic policies are 
concerned. The outcome of the political decisions made will then manifest itself in the 
organization of military forces in terms of strategy, culture, (top-level) structure, and 
processes. István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler put it succinctly by stating that “politics 
becomes a pacemaker for reformsit and nothing else determines the beat and the 
speed.”25   
Therefore, in this thesis two lenses of foreign and domestic policies as depicted in 
Figure 1 are applied to the case of the Bundeswehr’s latest reforms in order to access 
their organizational outcome and to serve as a framework for analysis: 
                                                 
24 See Herfried Münkler, “Heroische Und Postheroische Gesellschaften [Heroic and Post-Heroic 
Societies],” MERKUR 61, no. 8/09 (September 2007): 742–52. 
25 István. Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, eds., Post-Cold War Defense Reform : Lessons Learned in 
Europe and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 224. 
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Figure 1.  A Framework for Transition in a Changing Environment26 
 
                                                 
26 Source: own illustration. 
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3. Strategic Trends 
While politics shape the transformation of military forces, additional factors 
influence when, how quickly, and to what degree those changes occur. Throughout 
history military breakthroughs in weapons and organization have been achieved by 
bringing new technologies to armed forces, which then were able to turn the tables and 
defeat even far superior forces. Game-changing military technologies, including the 
invention of chariots, longbows, gunpowder, airplanes, nuclear weapons, and satellites 
with global positioning systems, have shocked those armies that failed to prove equal to 
them.27  
Today, nations strive to be ahead in military innovation as well as to emulate 
successful, more developed opponents and their strategies.28 Although the term 
disruptive technologies is employed in the military realm when talking about 
technologies that have the potential to drastically enhance or deeply marginalize a 
nation’s military power, it is not isolated to the military sphere. Disruptive technology 
drives innovation in many areas. Moreover, transformation “anticipates and creates the 
future and deals with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and 
technology. Profound change in any one of these areas necessitates change in all.”29  
With an armada of think tanks, modern militaries compete in analyzing and 
predicting the future in order to secure their forces any advantage possible and to adjust 
their organization to future challenges and not the ones of the present oreven 
worsethe past. The UK 2014 strategic trends study covers disruptive changes ranging 
from demography, to gender, to corruption, to urbanizationjust to mention a few.30 
Similar documents from the 2016 Swiss Center for Security Studies add aspects like 
                                                 
27 Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons 
and Tactics of Warfare, revised and enlarged ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). 
28 Farrell, Terry, and Frans, A Transformation Gap?, 7–10. 
29 U.S. Department of Defense, Director Force Transformation, Military Transformation a Strategic 
Approach (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003), 8. 
30 UK MOD JFC Development, “Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045” (Development, Concepts and 




irregular migration and a nuclear world lacking arms control to complete the dystopia.31 
The 2017 United States Army War College’s “Study on the Strategic Landscape 2050” 
explores scenarios like flooded coastlines and submerged cities, energy blackouts, and 
self-aware armed robotics.32 Meanwhile, the Bundeswehr Office for Defense Planning in 
its future topics research series publishes intensively about peak oil33 and human 
enhancement.34 
The main challenge for every nation remains to filter the different futures 
described by the various think tanks, and to conclude from them what adjustments need 
to be made to the military in order to be ready for the challenges in the uncertain future. 
Any results of the conclusion then need to be translated into consequences for defense 
planning, some of which are presented in Table 2: 
                                                 
31 Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe, and Andreas Wenger, Strategic Trends 2016 Key Developments in 
Global Affairs (ETH Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2016), 
https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-
studies/pdfs/ST2016.pdf. 
32 Roman Muzalevsky, Strategic Landscape 2050—Preparing the US Military for New Era Dynamics 
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 2017), 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1366.pdf. 
33 Kathrin Brockmann et al., “Peak Oil—Sicherheitspolitische Implikationen Knapper Ressourcen 





34 Annika Vergin, “Future Topic Human Enhancement—Eine Neue Herausforderung Für Streitkräfte? 








Table 2.   Consequences for Defense Planning35 
From To 
A focus on kinetics A focus on effects 
Twentieth-century processes Twenty-first century integrated approaches 
Static defense, garrison forces Mobile, expeditionary operations 
Under-resourced, standby forces Fully equipped combat ready units 
A battle-ready force (peace) Battle hardened forces (war) 
Large institutional forces (tail) More powerful operational capabilities (teeth) 
Major conventional combat operation Multiple irregular, asymmetric operations 
Separate military service concepts of 
operation 
Joint and combined operations   
Forces that need to deconflict Integrated, interdependent forces 
Emphasis on ships, tanks and aircraft Focus on information, knowledge, and timely, 
actionable intelligence 
Massing forces Massing effects 
Set-piece-maneuver and mass Agility and precision 
Single service acquisition systems Joint portfolio management 
Service ad agency intelligence Truly Joint Information Operation Centers 
Vertical structures and processes 
(stovepipes) 
More transparent, horizontal integration 
Moving the user to the data Moving data to the user 
Predetermines force packages Tailored, flexible forces 
Department of Defense solutions Interagency approaches 
Information technology Cybernetics 
  
 
The decision to undertake a transformation process affects all dimensions of 
organization identified before: strategy, culture, structure, and processes. Thus, it is 
                                                 
35 Adapted from Farrell, Terry, and Farrell, A Transformation Gap?, 18. 
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always imperative to consider that “major structural change is one of the most disruptive 
types of change that organizations experience because it deeply affects the informal 
organization, the network of interpersonal relationships and communication that members 
have established over time.”36 
B. GERMANY’S HISTORIC BURDEN 
To analyze the German military reforms, it is not only imperative to understand 
the nature of military transformation, but also the evolution of the Bundeswehr from its 
inception in 1950, since it bears a unique burden in the form of a difficult heritage of 
Nazi-Germany’s severe crimes against humanity in World War II. Therefore, this section 
examines the Bundeswehr’s historic roots in Europe as well as the difficult question of 
political-military balance in Europe to understand the historic constraints under which the 
Bundeswehr has operated since its inception. 
1. The Aftermath of World War II and the Birth of the Bundeswehr 
The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again 
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the 
accomplishment of this objective are [...] the industrial disarmament and 
demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s 
capacity to make war.37 
At the end of World War II Germany—or what was left of it—lay in ruins. At the 
so-called zero hour, marking the fall of the Third Reich and the beginning of a new era, 
Germany not only needed to be reconstructed but also reinvented.38 For the three 
Western occupation zones that were later merged into the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), the doctrine of denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and disarmament 
                                                 
36 Heffron, Organization Theory & Public Organizations, 166. 
37 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces 
(JCS 1067) (April 1945),” in United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in 
Documents, 2. 
38 Stephen Brockmann, German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour (Rochester, NY: BOYE6, 2009), 
8–24. 
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can be considered as the very core of the recreation of a now markedly peaceful German 
people.39  
In the years immediately following World War II, security in West Germany was 
consequently provided by the allied occupation forces only. Even in 1948–49, the writers 
of a provisional German constitutionthe Basic Lawbelieved that this condition 
would persist for the foreseeable future.40 According to Abenheim, “the spirit and letter 
of the West German Basic Law was, at the very least, neutral in its provisions for military 
power in the state, if indeed it was not antimilitary or pacifist in spirit.”41 He clarifies that 
Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic’s first chancellor, opposed the idea of creating 
German armed forces again, but was nevertheless prepared to consider a contingent to an 
army of a European confederation in the most extreme case.  
Abenheim notes that after the Soviets successfully detonated an atomic bomb, 
conducted the Berlin Blockade, and the war in Korea broke out, Winston Churchill 
demanded Germany contribute to European defense, being at its eastern flank, 
particularly. Adenauer complied with the request and thereby shocked his own cabinet, 
the German people, and the world: “For the third time in a single generation, after the 
creation of the Reichswehr in 1921 and of the Wehrmacht in 1935, a new army was to be 
raised on German soil.”42  
The idea of a united European force was soon abandoned, but in 1955, on the 
200th birthday of the Prussian military reformer Scharnhorst, the Bundeswehras a West 
German national armywas officially established and the Federal Republic of Germany 
became a member of the NATO alliance. After much trial in the 1960s, the Bundeswehr 
                                                 
39 Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 25. 
40 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, 
41. 
41 Abenheim, 42. 
42 Abenheim, 43. 
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reached full strength with up to 495,00043 soldiers to serve as a reliableif not 
thebackbone of NATO’s European conventional forces throughout the Cold War. In 
his history on The Cold War, Gaddis even judges the Bundeswehr to be “perhaps world’s 
best army.”44 Thus, although being built under the dark shadows of the Third Reich, the 
Bundeswehr and the West German rearmament helped Germany to regain recognition 
from its allies, which resulted in a relative normalization of relationships and the 
relaxation of Allied restraints.45  
2. Firm Roots in Europe 
Although the Bundeswehr was finally founded as one of two German armies in an 
alliance, an analysis of the events that prevented the creation of a European approach to 
defense in the early Cold War seems valuable to understand the mechanisms of balance 
of power in Europe that always played a decisive role in shaping, reforming, and 
deploying the Bundeswehr.   
In the light of the devastation that Germany had brought over the European 
continent in the second World War, European nations—and France particularly—were 
reluctant to even think about a German rearmament again and opposed a potential NATO 
membership.46 With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the Cold War 
becoming hot, France had to accept the need to counterbalance the overwhelming Soviet 
military forces in Europe.47 The demands of the United States for a Germany 
contributing to Europe’s security could no longer be ignored. Moreover, the idea of 
granting the West Germans a complete free ride in the military domain was not 
                                                 
43 Statista, “Personalbestand Der Bundeswehr Bis 2016 [Statistics of the Bundeswehr’s Workforce],” 
Statista, 2017, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/495515/umfrage/personalbestand-der-
bundeswehr/. 
44 Gaddis, The Cold War, 220. 
45 David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era, 3rd ed. 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
46 Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations 
and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 4. 
47 Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1980), 67–72. 
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acceptable for France either.48 Due to the fear of a German national military revival amid 
the Korean War, the French Prime Minister Pleven in October 1950 came up with the 
counter plan of a rearmed Germany within a supranational European Army.49  
According to Kevin Ruane, it was the French rationale that “under the Pleven 
Plan, there would be no independent German Army or General Staff for the forces of 
nationalism to rally around.”50 The West German rearmament was the dominant question 
in European diplomacy in the years to come. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris by 
six countries on May 27, 1952, the European Defense Community (EDC) was 
established.51 Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Luxembourgian forces would 
form a pan-European army. Although the British government chose to not participate in 
the EDC a close cooperation with the British military and even the guarantee of mutual 
assistance was agreed and amended as a special protocol to the EDC treaty.52  
Obviously, France was the strong man in the EDC. It was determined that the 
language of the Commissariat, the executive body of the EDC and vested with 
supervisory power, was to be French.53 Thus, in the wake of the French defeat in 
Indochina, and tolerated by the UK and the United States, the French National Assembly 
shockingly put an end to the idea of an integrated European defense force on August 30, 
1954, by not ratifying the treaty. French domestic problems as well a changed 
international situation accounted for the failure. It resulted from France’s fear of losing its 
national sovereignty, of a rearmed West Germany, the non-participation of the United 
Kingdom, and being tied too closely to the United States against the Soviet bloc, to 
                                                 
48 Large, Germans to the Front, 120. 
49 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 4. 
50 Ruane, 4. 
51 Ruane, 15. 
52 U.S. Senate, European Defense Community Treaty (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, June 2, 1952), 227–28. 
53 U.S. Senate, 217. 
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Stalin’s death, as well as the unhappy end of the Vietnam War and onset of conflict in 
Algeria.54 
The French refusal to ratify the treaty sent out shockwaves in European 
diplomatic and political circles and beyond. Only the Soviets were delighted. According 
to Fursdon, “as the enormity of the destruction of four years’ painstaking, sensitive, 
difficult work and statesmanship penetrated through the numbness of despair, the only 
question that mattered was what next?”55 France, which had been the engine of European 
integration for the years after World War II, was now discredited and the center of action 
for European defense had literally overnight changed from Paris to Bonn.56 
In search of an alternative framework for a German military contribution to 
Europe’s defense against communism, the British took over the initiative by suggesting 
that the 1948 Brussels Treaty should become that basis.57 After being given assurances 
by Germany, France agreed to the FRG becoming a member of NATO and the 
establishment of own (national) military forces.58 
Although the EDC never saw the light of day it has to be considered as a unique 
milestone of historic importance. Edward Fursdon argues that “its failure had led to the 
realization of the very event which the EDC had originally been designed to prevent.”59 
It laid the very foundations of Western Europe’s defense and security as well as for a 
European political community and therefore must be regarded as a success. The idea of a 
European military integration at least has never ceased to exist. In the contemporary 
debate on the future of the transatlantic security framework and Europe’s contribution 
                                                 
54 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 89–110; Fursdon, The European 
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55 Fursdon, The European Defence Community, 303. 
56 Fursdon, 309. 
57 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
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under the perception of an increased threat from the East it is even more prevalent than 
ever. 
3. The “Other Germany” 
In the other Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Nationale 
Volksarmee (NVA—National People’s Army) was created in 1956 from existing 
camouflaged military units as a direct answer to the foundation of the Bundeswehr: the 
NVA immediately became a member of the Warsaw Pact. Essentially formed from a 
heavily armed and mobile national police force, “even at the height of the Cold War, they 
were never anything but a reserve to the Operational Maneuver Groups of the Soviet 
Group of Forces in Germany.”60 Moreover, Dan Jordan argues, that the NVA suffered 
from bureaucratic, organizational, and ideologic dysfunctionalities which, by the 1980s, 
made the NVA a “huge anchor that helped sink the GDR.”61  
Notably, when the Berlin Wall finally came down in 1989, liberating East 
Germany from dictatorship, neither side of the German Armed Forces—Bundeswehr and 
NVA—fired a single shot. Moreover, the leadership and ranks of the NVA completely 
refrained from taking action against demonstrators in Leipzig or Erfurt, for instance, even 
as the anti-regime demonstrations drew more people to the streets on Monday nights. Not 
least because of this restraint—in stark contrast to the response to the workers uprising on 
June 17, 1953, or the Prague Spring of 1968—the reunification of the two Germanies 
successfully rested on the unification of the two—formerly adversarial—armed forces. 
Having been in charge on behalf of the West German Ministry of Defense to take 
over and integrate the East German forces, the former Bundeswehr-General Jörg 
Schönbohm in his book Two Armies and One Fatherland: The End of the Nationale 
Volksarmee62 analyzes from a commander’s perspective his difficult, sometimes almost 
incredible, way to a well-recognized success. The German “military unification” and the 
                                                 
60 Dan Jordan, “Failure to Command: The Political Underpinnings of the Failure of the Nationale 
Volksarmee as a Social Institution,” in Rearming Germany, ed. James S. Corum (Leiden ; Boston: BRILL, 
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61 Jordan, 256. 
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integration of the soldiers of the East German National People’s Army, according to 
Schönbohm, “is a credit not only to the Bundeswehr as a whole, but also to those NVA 
servicemen, who, after the political changeover, felt committed to the common goal of 
all-German armed forces.”63 
4. German Reunification and the Military Question 
The German reunification clearly was a worrisome and delicate issue for the 
European and allied countries who suffered from two world wars, as well as the Four 
Allied Powers, which wielded authority according to their rights and responsibilities in 
Berlin and Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, “with the wall breached, everything was 
possible.”64 Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, pushed in favor of a 
reunification and skillfully managed to rally crucial allies. In January 1990, even 
Gorbachev agreed or at least saw no other choice: “German reunification should be 
regarded as inevitable.”65  
The question of whether a reunified Germany should remain in the NATO 
alliance, stay neutral, or even have a dual membership in both military alliances—
Warsaw Pact and NATO—still had to be agreed upon in the few months in 1990 when 
unification became a practical goal of policy. In the end, Gorbachev accepted the 
American and West German position of a reunited Germany being part of NATO, while 
the allies would refrain from stationing forces in the integrated military structure in the 
former GDR/five new state, and thus caused the once unthinkable to happen: “Soviet 
forces stationed on German territory would withdraw while American forces stationed on 
German territory would remain.”66 
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With the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany67 (German 
Treaty) the Four Powers finally set the terms for the unification of Germany by 
simultaneously ensuring their own—as well as the other European countries’—security 
interests through disarmament in Central Europe in line with the force cuts that had been 
enshrined with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The right of self-
determination was granted to the German people under mutually agreed terms. With 
regard to the German military—keeping the name Bundeswehr and integrating soldiers 
and certain units of the former NVA—the German treaty especially demanded a 
reduction in personnel strength from about 700,000 to 370,000 and banned the 
deployment of nuclear weapon systems on the territory of the former GDR.68 
Most importantly, the German Treaty clearly shaped the framework for the use of 
military force: “acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful 
relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional 
and a punishable offence. [...] Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in 
accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.”69 Bearing in 
mind its responsibility to promote peace imposed by the treaty, Germany not only fully 
respects that declaration today and assures to continue to do so in the future but chooses 
to identify itself with it in a way that has truly made it the reason of state. Most notably, 
nowadays this specific commitment may even lead to the potential situation in which 
Germany has to deny requests of the former Four Powers to join in military campaigns of 
coalitions,70 when they are not mandated by the United Nations or another system of 
mutual collective security and/or are not in conformity with the German constitution—
the Basic Law. 
                                                 
67 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, Treaty on 
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The German Treaty is accurately described by the statement that “only peace will 
emanate from German soil.”71 This idea has not only become the principle of 
government regarding defense and security policy, but also a widespread attitude among 
the German society.  
 
                                                 
71 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 4. 
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III. THE REORIENTATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR— 
A FORESEEABLE FAILURE? 
In 2011, in the midst of a severe economic crisis (often referred to as the 
European sovereign debt crisis), German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière 
announced the most comprehensive military reform in post-unification German history.72 
It aimed at the final step in the process begun in the early 1990s to the cumbersome 
Bundeswehr into desperately needed expeditionary forces with enhanced capabilities, 
while significantly reducing defense expenditures by casting off what had come to be 
seen as wasteful overhead of “legacy Cold War” systems. Additionally, the reform 
intended to suspend conscription, streamline command structures, professionalize and 
render highly efficient the management of process, human resources, and defense 
procurement. In other words, the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr was nothing 
more and nothing less than an attempt to square the circle. It was a much ballyhooed 
reform, intended as the last of the reforms that had begun in 1989–1990. In retrospect, it 
also appears to have been all the more problematic in the wake of the strategic turn that 
was to unfold 24 months later in Europe.  
A. DRIVING FACTORS OF THE REORGANIZATION 
Understanding the reorientation is also important in order to determine why the 
Bundeswehr later in 2016 began to undertake considerable adjustments (the so-called 
Turnaround), although the Reorientation of 2010/11 still officially represents the current 
and valid structural layout and conceptional doctrine of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the 
dvaluation of the reorientation is also intended to provide a starting point for further 
analysis in Chapter IV on the turnaround of the Bundeswehr, which eventually started to 
address the shortcomings of the reorientation and—with some controversy—culminated 
in a reform of the reform. 
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Applying the framework of policy analysis as the sole driver of transformation,73 
this chapter examines the following the changes in the environment that led to the 
Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, from a perspective of foreign as well as domestic 
policies. On this basis, the organizational consequences for the Bundeswehr—with a 
special focus on reform fatigue—is discussed. 
1. Multinationality—Security Identity or Excuse? 
After the end of the Cold War the security situation in Europe had changed 
drastically for the better and then problems crowded in.74 The bipolar world order, when 
based on nuclear deterrence, provided stability for the continent and the world as a whole, 
but that changed into a world of alternating multipolarity with new threats and new 
challenges.75 The Merkel cabinet’s 2006 White Paper “On German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr” listed risks ranging from terrorism to proliferation and 
military buildup, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade, failed states, organized crime, 
migration, energy blackouts, epidemics and pandemics.76 
Germany, now surrounded by friends, needed to rethink its defense posture and 
adjust it to a new reality not only of relative peace in Europe itself, but of conflicts over 
the horizon affecting German and European security. The Federal Republic would no 
longer be the frontline in case of an attack on European NATO forces; that role now 
belonged to Poland and the Baltics. If it came down to defending the alliance, Germany 
therefore would need to send out robust, mobile deployment forces, capable of operating 
with national logistics and support over lines unknown in the Cold War. These troops  
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would have to resemble those already deployed in missions abroad—no longer a novelty 
for the Bundeswehr, which had begun military deployments in the 1990s amid a 
transformation of security building and anti-terror operations in the alliance and 
collective security. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, United Germany 
now openly acknowledged that “German security policy also has to take account of 
developments in geographically remote regions, insofar as they affect our interests.”77 
Issuing the new defense policy guidelines (a document subordinate to the White 
Paper) in 2011, which marked the official start for this reorientation, Germany self-
assuredly stated that its “place in the world is characterized above all by our interests as a 
strong nation in the centre of Europe and by our international responsibility for peace and 
freedom. [...] As an active member of the international community, Germany pursues its 
interests and is actively striving for better and safer world.”78 Thus, the paradigm shift 
from defending its own territory to becoming a defender of the liberal world via security 
building and counterterror deployments was now the officially declared reason of state. 
In its comprehensive brochure titled “Reorientation of the Bundeswehr,” which 
served as a policy statement in adjunct to the aforementioned policy guidelines, the 
German Ministry of Defense stressed that “multinationality as part of the Bundeswehr’s 
security identity does not only imply the assumption of international responsibility, but 
also coordination with partners in terms of future capability development.”79 
Continuously stressing the need for coordination, pooling, sharing, smart defense, and 
collaboration among European partner nations in costly armament projects underlined 
that economic aspects were one of the key—if not decisive—motives of this reorientation 
while the period of peace in Europe was quietly running out.  
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Germany could count on the willingness of its neighbors to give preference to 
effectiveness instead of sovereignty, particularly with the debt crisis full in swing. The 
prospect of considerable savings in their military budgets made the European nations 
accept so-called multilateralism traps, that is, “being left alone in an operation because a 
partner withdraws its troops; not being able to engage in an operation, as a partner with 
important capabilities is not participating; and giving others, who do not make any 
contributions of their own to security, the opportunity to act as free rider.”80 
2. Pressure on the Home Front 
After reunification, the demands on the German military were continually rising 
in the wider cosmos with the responsibilities of post-conflict security building and 
collective security. Yet despite the demands of collective defense after 11 September, the 
calls at home for harvesting a post-Cold War peace dividend did not stop. And while that 
discrepancy became increasingly obvious, in 2009 the new government in its 17th 
Bundestag legislative period ordered the German Minister of Defense to appoint a 
commission with the task to submit a proposal for a new organizational structure of the 
Bundeswehr—aimed to shrink and streamline the leadership and administrative structure 
in favor of boots on the ground.81 When the report of the so-called Weise-Commission82 
was published in October 2010, the findings shook the Bundeswehr to its very 
foundations: it stated an obvious point that many had preferred to ignore, namely, that the 
German military was a systematically strained organization, suffering from a generic 
diffusion of responsibility, and incapable of being led, managed, and controlled in a 
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target-oriented manner.83 The commission suggested boldly—among other things—to 
cut the number of posts in the Ministry of Defense in half, to reduce the force strength to 
no more than 180,000 soldiers (focused on deployment missions at great distance from 
home), and to suspend compulsory military service. Although in the German political 
spectrum it was widely agreed that the commission’s proposal went too far to become 
fully implemented in practice, then German Defense Minister Theo zu Guttenberg (CSU) 
decided to address the deficits of the Bundeswehr most widely based on the Weise-
commission’s report.  
In light of the European economic crisis, which emerged in 2010 in parallel to the 
endeavors of reorganizing the German armed forces, zu Guttenberg furthermore decided 
to contribute substantial savings at the expense of the military budget. That is, he 
intended to cut guns in favor of butter as had been the custom from the onset of 
unification in late 1989 onwards. As the German Finance Minister aimed to find $102 
billion in savings in the years 2011–2014 due to the Euro-crisis, the Defense Minister had 
to do his part by delivering $10 billion in savings over the next four years.84 Zu 
Guttenberg, allegedly planning to run for chancellor, accepted that task and promised to 
deliver the requested amount.  
Nevertheless, the options for cutting the military budget were limited because 
“since the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr has been in a process of almost constant 
reform.”85 That is to say, a steady process of shrinking budget and force reductions led to 
a correspondingly shrinking focus on the classic role of armies and air forces in Europe. 
Defense Minister zu Guttenberg, a young and aspiring shooting star of the conservatives, 
believed he had found an alternative and shocked his party by openly questioning 
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compulsory service. Not only did the Federal Ministry of Defense believe that this reform 
would allow at least for a part of the much-needed savings, but also zu Guttenberg had a 
keen instinct for public opinion.86 The fairness of the draft in Germany has been 
questioned for decades, since on a percentage basis fewer young men were being drafted 
into military service. A rising number of lawsuits therefore sought a final decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court on the question of whether “conscription is still consistent 
with Germany’s Basic Law or whether it violates principles of equity by being a form of 
selective or fictitious conscription.”87 
The question of abolishing conscription was heavily disputed in the German party 
spectrum, the society, and even in the military itself. While the majority agreed that 
conscription helped to link the Bundeswehr to the democratic system, to provide a 
recruitment base for military professionals, and to strengthen strong civil-military 
regulations, they acknowledged the resulting inefficiency and incompatibility with 
operational needs. From 1970 to 2004 the duration of conscription was successively 
decreased from 18 months to nine at present, as depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Duration of Military Service88 
 Military Service (in Months) 
July 1962 – December 1972 18 
January 1973 – September 1990 15 
October 1990 – December 1995 12 
January 1996 – June 2000 10 
Since January 2002 9 
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With only a nine-month service commitment the cost-benefit ratio of training the 
young recruits was too low, since they could not be deployed in missions abroad or used 
in special roles that required high skills and additional education. Because the number of 
conscripts and the length of their service had been reduced so far, Kümmel, a 
Bundeswehr social scientist, argued that “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
Bundeswehr was, in fact, an all-volunteer force in disguise.”89 Zu Guttenberg was aware 
of that and managed to calm his critics on all sides by using an astonishing argument: He 
recommended merely suspending conscription. Formally, this was not an outright 
abolition, although it was no secret that once conscription was suspended, it would be 
nearly impossible to reinstate.  
After zu Guttenberg was forced to resign from office in 2011 due to accusations 
of plagiarism in his dissertation, Thomas de Maizière, the son of the former Chief of 
Defense and founder of the Bundeswehr, Ulrich de Maizière, took over as Minister of 
Defense and finalized the reorganization of the Bundeswehr on the basis of his 
predecessor’s work.  
3. Reform Fatigue—the Curse of the Bundeswehr 
We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form 
up into teams we would be reorganized. Presumably the plans for our 
employment were being changed.  
I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at 
organizing, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; 
and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress 
while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.  
During our reorganizations, several commanding officers were tried out on 
us, which added to the discontinuity.90 
This famous quote by Charlton Ogburn Jr.—often falsely attributed to Gaius 
Petronius (A.D. 27)—stands for the story of the Bundeswehr in respect to its unique 
transformation over the last quarter century. During little more than its 60 years of 
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existence, the German military has been reorganized so many times that it is even hard to 
exactly quantify the number of restructurings it has had to cope with. The reason behind 
this process can only be explained by the peculiarity that it was not only the Bundeswehr 
in its entirety, but also the different military branches and services that regularly had to 
face the fate of transformation, making it as much a phenomenon in the allied forces as it 
was in the Bundeswehr.  
If one looks, for example, at the history of the German Army within the 
Bundeswehr, which is by far the largest of the military services, one will recognize that 
there have been at least nine reorganizations of this branch alone.91 While from 1956 to 
1974 these structures have just been consecutively numbered army structure one to army 
structure five, the labeling fortunately changed in the following years before the army ran 
out of single-digit numbers. Army structure five was followed by Army structure five “b” 
and the new army for new challenges in 1994, which was then in 2000 again replaced by 
the army of the future, which became replaced then by the—again—new army in 2010.92 
It is to be hoped that someday it will return to simply the German Army. 
In addition to the army, the German air force went through air force structure one 
to air force structure six. Despite its precursor’s invention in Germany in 1938, the 
Luftwaffe of the FRG struggled at its birth with such issues as the jet age, which had 
advanced for ten years after 1945.  Even more dizzying was the impact of nuclear 
weapons on warfare during that period. While the adjustment to new challenges certainly 
played a role in these reorganizations, it was often a tight budget that forced the 
Luftwaffe with its expensive weapon systems to transform in order to be more efficient 
and to cost less.93 Furthermore, since the Luftwaffe repeatedly failed to successfully 
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transform into the preceding structure (or structures) before starting to reorganize again, 
the Luftwaffe decided to refrain from designating a target date at all when it wanted air 
force structure six to be fully implemented.94 In fairness, though, the air force did not 
differ from the army or the other services of the Bundeswehr in this regard. 
With the latest big reform of the German forces, the so-called Transformation of 
the Bundeswehr which started in 2005, defense minister Peter Struck (SPD) and Chief of 
Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan announced the final reform for the Bundeswehr: while in 
the past there were numerous reforms at random intervals, from now on—according to 
Schneiderhan—the armed forces would change into a status of permanent transformation 
in order to adjust to changes in the environment.95 Aimed at enhancing the Bundeswehr’s 
capabilities for missions abroad, the role of the chief of staff of the Bundeswehr was 
strengthened while the chiefs of the services were now directly responsible for the 
operational readiness of their forces.96 Moreover, the troops became designated as rapid 
response forces, stabilization forces, as well as supporting forces in order to prepare them 
optimally for their respective mission.97 The soldiers in the armed forces soon came to 
discover that this reform meant nothing different but prioritization in times of scarce 
resources. And prioritization might also be a synonym for a mere administration of 
deficiencies. Anyone not in the rapid response forces from now on used transformation 
as a swear word only. 
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Soldiers in the Bundeswehr, however, were not only suffering from their military 
reforms. On top of it all they also had to adapt to reforms of government and society 
as does each German citizen. These measures ranged from currency reform to spelling 
reform, educational reform, reform of federalism, health care reform, and social reform. 
On important issues—tax and pension reforms—Germans, whether in the military or 
not, were still waiting. It was exactly in that traumatizing situation of reform-fatigue, that 
defense minister Thomas de Maizière announced the next big reform by saying that 
the “reorientation far exceeds the scope of any reforms that have taken place in 
earlier years.”98 
B. REORIENTATION AS THE MAJOR STRUCTURAL REFORM 
Since unity in 1990, countless officially ordered reports have stressed the need for 
reforming the German armed forces: aside from the role of the military in national unity 
itself in 1990–1995, the most prominent focal points are detailed in the report of the 
commission for the future of the Bundeswehr99 from 2000 and the report of the 
Bundeswehr structure commission100 from 2010. The former was written in the wake of 
national unity and the 1999 NATO strategic concept with its emphasis on post-conflict 
security, while the 2010 report was an expression of the impact of the September 11 
paradigm shift as well as 2008 world depression and the stresses and strains of the 
Afghan International Security Assistance Force mission as these manifested themselves 
after 2009. While the 2000 report from the so-called Weizsäcker Commission (led by the 
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sharing and strengthening collective defense by adhering to conscription, the 2010 report  
from the so-called Weise Commission (led by the Frank-Jürgen Weise, reservist and 
chief executive officer of the German employment agency) focused on efficiency, as well 
as lean- and process management, and proposed suspending conscription. The first 
reform had a solid military character, not the least because von Weizsäcker as an ex-
soldier had an ongoing interest in and sympathy for the spirit of the Bundeswehr as a 
whole.  
The second reform, possessed by the spirit of globalized managerial science 
in turbo capitalism, was a measure of austerity and efficiency that unfolded as the 
epoch of peace in Europe was stumbling to an end. The propositions of the Weise 
Commission were implemented at least to some degree and laid the foundation for one 
of the most extensive reforms of the Bundeswehr—the so-called Reorientation of the 
Bundeswehr in 2010. 
1. Philosophy and Approaches to Modernization 
In the light of the European sovereign debt crisis, the reform approach of the 
reorientationstarted by zu Guttenberg, and continued and implemented by his 
successor de Maizièreunsurprisingly followed a strictly economic logic.101 When 
Defense Minister de Maizière gave the starting signal of his new reform by issuing new 
defense policy guidelines102 and holding a speech in Berlin on May 18, 2011, in Berlin, 
he referred, as so often happens, to Clausewitz in his very first sentence after his salutary 
address: He pointed out that according to Clausewitz it is advisable to use only those 
resources and to set only those goals that are needed to achieve the desired political  
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purpose.103  Taking a page from programming, planning, and budgeting in its classical 
form circa 1961, De Maizière argued that the expenditures for personnel were too high  
with the operating costs too low at the same time. Listening to his speech it was 
reasonable to doubt that it was a Federal Minister of Defense speaking and not the chief 
executive officer of a global corporation of the 21st century model. The rationale for the 
reorientation was clearly derived from fiscal efficiency instead of security policy and 
strategy in the classical sense.  
To cut costs to the desired level, the key element of the reorientation was to 
transform the Bundeswehr to a much smaller, even more capable military force with its 
“defence expenditure in keeping with the mission of the Bundeswehr, and a sustainable 
financial base.”104 With compulsory military service suspended, every single entity of 
the Bundeswehr needed to be redesigned to this efficiency on the deployment model. 
Moreover, de Maizière aimed at “merging functional and organizational expertise on all 
levels and strengthening mixed civilian-military structures.”105 Such a move constituted 
a revolution in the brains of the Bundeswehr and took a meat axe to honored structures of 
Bonn and Berlin that had a tradition quite their own.  
Nonetheless, one would do the reorientation an injustice to characterize it as a 
cost-cutting program only. In addition to introducing organizational and structural 
adjustments it was also meant to modernize the cumbersome Bundeswehr and, once 
again, to implement professional management methods. From one day to another, the 
soldiers and civilians in the military had to face the implementation of new public 
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change management, results-oriented control, cost performance accounting, and 
continuous improvement programs, to name but a few moments in this whirlwind.106 
The information technology (IT) infrastructure of the Bundeswehr was to be harmonized,  
administrative workflows optimized, and all provisions and doctrines digitized. In other 
words, the reorientation availed itself of the treasured “disruption” that in Silicon Valley 
and elsewhere is held up as the cardinal good of management and corporate public 
relations, but its impact on an army and its brains, especially on the cusp of another 
change in the foundations of European security, was something else yet again. 
2. Structure, Organization, and Stationing 
In 2011, de Maizière announced the Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, by—
among other things—cutting the strength from 250,000 to 185,000 military personnel, 
with as many as 170,000 career soldiers and up to 15,000 volunteers.107 The German 
compulsory military service was suspended, a new voluntary service was created, and the 
army reserve concept was revised. The Federal Ministry of Defense was reorganized into 
nine directorates-general and cut by one third, and the service chiefs of staff were 
relocated outside the ministry.108 It was also decided that from now on the chief of 
defense would be a part of the executive group of the Federal Ministry of Defense and 
have command responsibility over all soldiers of the Bundeswehr.109 Additionally, he 
was assigned to the directorates-general for planning, forces policy, and strategy and 
operation as depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Command and Control Structure of the Federal Ministry 
of Defense110 
 
While the five military major organizational elements Air force, Army, Navy, 
Joint Medical Service, and Joint Support Service were retained, defense procurement, 
information technology, and defense planning capabilities each became pooled. This 
meant tough cuts especially to the traditional military services of the air force, navy, and 
army: From now on a centralized Bundeswehr Planning Office would be in charge of 
further technological and doctrine development, and the Federal Office of Bundeswehr 
Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support would take over 
responsibility for the material responsibility of all major weapon systems—at least for all 
those weapons that were kept in service. The reorientation made no exception to materiel 
when it came to identify potential for savings. In the case for the army, fatefully enough, 
this measure implied cutting the number of main battle tanks down to 225 Leopard 2, as 
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depicted in Figure 2. The most symbolic weapon system of the army, the core of its 
identity, a mythos of German engineering, an export hit and backbone of national 
defense, had been reduced to a homoeopathic dosage. Meanwhile, one has to speculate 
that curious eyes in the Kremlin must have peered over the horizon as German 
disarmament coincided with the steady eclipse of U.S. Army ground strength in NATO 
Europe. From over 3,000 main battle tanks during the Cold War, the German Army was 
reduced to just a fraction of that in under 25 years. The other services and their major 
equipment did not fare better. This small(er) numbers of weapon systems was attributed 
to the fact that de Maizière and his planners—although looking to save every single 
Euro—were not yet willing to give up any of the Bundeswehr’s existing capabilities. The 
newly coined mantra was Breite vor Tiefe [width over depth] or, in other words, a little 
bit of everything.  
Figure 2.  Major Equipment of the Army after Reorientation111 
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The chiefs of staff of the military services, having been eliminated from the 
Federal Ministry of Defense and deprived of long-held powers and many of their 
prestigious weapon systems, were now kept under tight reins by suffocating technocratic 
management techniques: They were the obvious losers of the new reform.  
Along with the organizational and structural adjustments, the stationing of the 
Bundeswehr needed to be evaluated and synchronized with the cutback of troops and 
command structures. Officially, the new stationing concept for the Bundeswehr was 
“based on the principles of functionality, cost-effectiveness, attractiveness and a broad 
presence throughout Germany.”112 This mouthful could not negate or neutralize the 
intensely political and freighted nature of military basing, organization custom, and 
domestic politics. In the course of the reorientation the real assets of the Bundeswehr 
were transferred to the federal agency for real estate tasks under the authority of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance. In line with the global capitalist trend of outsourcing and the 
just-in-time logistics and infrastructure, the Bundeswehr became a tenant in its own 
former properties. Conflicting interests from various quarters therefore influenced the 
highly delicate process of adjusting the stationing of the Bundeswehr. As was no surprise, 
pacifist politicians in rural and structurally weak regions rediscovered their love for the 
Bundeswehr while those in financially strong areas coveted Bundeswehr real estate, 
which they could convert into commercial, industrial, or residential zones. 
The new stationing concept of de Maizière’s reform led to a reduction from 394 to 
264 Bundeswehr bases and facilities in Germany. While the German society appreciated 
the Bundeswehr’s efforts to contribute to the state budget in difficult times, the 
consequences of closing infrastructure affected entire areas, reduced the footprint of the 
Bundeswehr in certain regions and thus, fatefully enough, its connection to the civil 
society. For some of the economically weaker federal states, as for example Schleswig-
Holstein or Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, this policy meant harsh cuts (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Stationing Density throughout Germany  
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C. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE REORIENTATION 
So far, only one book has been written and recently published about the 
reorientation of the Bundeswehr: In Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr: Ansatz, 
Umsetzung und Ergebnisse im Nationalen und Internationalen Vergleich.113 The author, 
Joachim Jens Hesse, portrays the reorientation as the most remarkable, significant, and 
successful approach to reform in German history, leading to a reduction in costs and 
personnel while enhancing efficiency and effectiveness at the same time.114 Following 
Hesse’s argument, it remains a mystery why the core changes from the reorientation now 
had to be revoked for the most part and at substantial costs.  
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Looking back in history, it seems difficult to understand how a highly complex 
reorganization and extensive downsizing of personnel, which relied on drastic cutbacks in 
the number of armed forces and the replacement of compulsory with voluntary military 
service, was meant to generate $10 billion in the first four years of its implementation. It 
is not necessary to have a background in business administration to understand that seed 
funding is necessary for medium- or long-term savings from major transformation 
operations. Moreover, to get the expected return on an organizational change, one has to 
make an investment first, as “planned change to improve organizational performance 
requires resources.”115 
De Maizière soon had to realize that his predecessor’s promised savings of $10 
billion over four years were beyond reach. However, being a skillful negotiator, he 
managed to get a one-year reprieve from the Federal Finance Minister, whose power over 
the budget is unlike U.S. practice, as well as the promise, that the costs of the 
Afghanistan-mission (after all more than $1 billion per year) would be financed from the 
defense budget.116 In summary, this step meant that the primary goal of the reorientation, 
to contribute $10 billion to the federal budget, had not even been halfway realized. The 
collateral damage, however, was caused in full since “major structural reorganization 
takes several years to shake down. In their first year or two, new departments are likely to 
be less efficient, not more; to display lower morale; not higher; to afford greater 
opportunities, not smaller, for error, confusion, and scandal.”117 
The Bundeswehr’s reform fatigue at the beginning of the reorientation intensified 
the negative side effects of perpetual change. Two independent surveys commissioned 
by the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Deutscher Bundeswehrverband (Armed 
Forces Labor Association) revealed surprisingly similar results. The vast majority of  
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respondents, all soldiers of the Bundeswehr, considered the reform to have failed 
miserably.118 They felt poorly informed, overwhelmed with additional workload, 
demotivated, and insufficiently involved. With the suspension of compulsory military 
service, the Bundeswehr now had to rely on word-of-mouth advertising to recruit new 
personnel, and the recruitment problems had become more intense. 
Surprisingly the up to 15,000 volunteers did not provide relief to the strained 
personnel situation since it was often not possible employ them for demanding tasks. In 
fact, the idea failed because there was simply no way to predict whether a volunteer 
would be available at the exact time a single soldier was needed. As a consequence, many 
jobs that have been staffed by conscripts before, as for instance a helmsman on a navy 
ship, now had to be done by non-commissioned officers. This bottleneck once again 
contributed to a worsening personnel situation. Harald Kujat, former chief of defense, 
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and favorite talk show General a.D. 
therefore spoke of the smallest army with the lowest morale in the history of the 
Bundeswehr.119 
Severe reductions in equipment, major weapon systems, spare parts, and 
consumable items also impacted the morale of the troops as well as their level of training. 
Such items were transformed by austerity and force reductions into precious items; the 
few available operational tanks, rifles, night vision goggles, or protective vests now 
needed to circulate between different units when those units went either on a mission 
abroad or a military training area. “Dynamic availability management” was the 
euphemism that was created for this ignominious procedure that soon became noticeable 
in civil military relations and in alliance burden sharing. 
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The new stationing concept of the Bundeswehr added additional hardships to the 
soldiers and their families. Not only did they have to help transform their respective 
military entity to new standards, into new structures, and to new courses of procedure, 
but the majority also had to relocate to new units and thus to new homes in a country 
where such perpetual relocation is frowned upon. Although the reorientation only cut 
down the number of soldiers by roughly one third, literally everyone in the Bundeswehr 
was affected. A look at the plan for the implementation of the air force structure reveals 
the reason for this unexpected outcome: Every single organizational element of the air 
force was affected by the reform and had to relocate, disband, change its subordination, 
reorganize, or even change affiliation of service.120 
In the new post-Reorientation era a variety of modern management methods 
competed for supremacy. As Minister de Maizière had structured the new Bundeswehr 
along technical responsibility and functional competence instead of old-fashioned unity 
of command hierarchy, ordinary soldiers and superiors often found it difficult to maintain 
an overview of the command and control organization. Was it the process manager, the 
technical competency expert, or the good old-fashioned military superior in the higher 
echelon to whom one turned to with a specific problem? With process management as an 
organizational second layer over the hierarchic command structure and a virtual matrix 
organization of functional responsibilities on top, the confusion was made perfect. 
Additionally, the organizational adjustments between the military services were not 
synchronized. While the air force disbanded its Force Training Command, which it had 
considered dispensable, the army created a new Army Force Training Command for 
itself. Moreover, as the only service in the Bundeswehr, the army created a new Office of 
Army Development with more than 600 soldiers, predominantly officers. The German 
Navy now performs the same tasks with only a hand full of officers out of its regular 
command structure. 
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De Maizière was right: his reform was the most ambitious and radical one in the 
history of the Bundeswehr. It led to overstressed personnel and material, and the level of 
stress gradually increased until it could no longer be overlooked. The Bundeswehr soon 
found itself confronting an increasing gap between demands on the one side, and 
resources available on the other. Since the coalition treaty of the new government of the 
18th legislative period clearly forbade a reorientation of the Reorientation of the 
Bundeswehr by committing to adhere to the decisions only just made, the need for an 
external trigger became obvious. The hopes of politicians with special expertise in 
military and high-ranking officers rested now on NATO. 
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IV. GERMANY’S MILITARY TURNAROUND 
The world of 2016 is unsettled. We in Germany and Europe are seeing and 
feeling the impact of a lack of freedom and of crises and conflicts. We are 
experiencing that peace and stability are not a matter of course even in 
Europe. In this changed security situation, the task of the Federal 
Government is to redefine our country’s security policy interests, priorities 
and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly.121 
—Berlin, July 13, 2016, Dr. Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor 
 
In the years since 1990, the reunited Germany never has grown tired of saying 
that it felt “surrounded by friends.” So what could force a (now) reputedly pacifist nation 
like Germany to change its foreign and security policies so significantly? Why did it send 
out such a remarkable signal to its allies, its people, but most especially to its possible 
adversaries? Why exactly did Germany choose to rethink its role in the defense and 
security environment? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand Germany’s rationale for 
initiating a military expansion at this exact instant despite its domestic limitations, and 
the role that NATO played must also be considered. Therefore, this chapter focuses on 
the two NATO summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016, which set the stage for 
Germany’s new military expansion. Although the field of NATO allies tends to be well-
researched in general, this specific question has not been investigated yet in any detail 
because of its topicality and the classification period of most of its underlying documents. 
Thus, the following analysis relies mainly on the primary resources publicly available as 
well as on the contemporary perceptions of its matter in scholarly research and media 
coverage.  
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Based on the critical appraisal of the reorientation, the Bundeswehr’s latest 
reform, this chapter analyzes the reasons for and events that have led to a turning point in 
recent history. Furthermore, the chapter discussion addresses the question of whether the 
German military expansion is truly intended to achieve NATO goals with the required 
new capabilities. Of particular concern here are the questions: what made Germany 
reorient itself from being a “bridge between Europe and Russia” to national and 
collective defense against Russia, now clearly a potential adversary, and thereby 
substantially reshaping its defense and security policy? Which developments contributed 
to this reorientation of Germany?  
A. RATIONALE AND FORCES FOR A HIDDEN REFORM 
From a German perspective, the contemporary European security architecture 
thus far has been defined by two pivotal points in European history: The first was the 
aftermath of World War II, with Germany divided under allied occupation “to prevent 
Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.”122 The second, 
marked by the end of the Cold War, was the consequent reunification of Germany, which 
regained its sovereignty and finally pursued its rightful peace dividend.  
The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany123 has shaped post-
Cold War Europe. Germany, with its location in the center of Europe, liked to see itself 
as a bridge between the West and the East, particularly Russia. It is arguable, however, 
that the Ukraine crisis (along with the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-
puppeteered insurgency in eastern Ukraine) had led to a fundamental realignment of 
German security policy, especially with respect to Russia.  
This realignment not only put an end to the period of German military personnel 
restrictions and the expectation of a peace dividend, but also concluded the German self-
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imposed restrictions regarding military commitments and willingness to finally accept 
greater responsibility in an out-of-joint world.  
1. A World Out of Joint 
Looking at the various European and German white papers, doctrines, and reports 
dealing with defense and security policy that were issued after the end of the Cold War, 
one cannot escape the impression that the security situation has changed drastically in 
recent years, showing a downward trend into chaos. Political and military leaders across 
these publications are competing in the prefaces to bemoan the constantly deteriorating 
security situation and to call for a stronger commitment to and acceptance of 
responsibility. The wide range of crises that must be addressed pertains to interstate 
conflicts on territory, fragile states, poor governance, climate change, proliferation, 
migration movements, epidemics and pandemics, the fight against transnational 
terrorism, natural or man-made disasters, unconventional and hybrid warfare, cyber-
attacks, civil wars, and religious conflicts—just to mention a few. 
In line with the fundamentally pacifistic attitude or skepticism about military 
affairs of the German society under which the German military has been operating since 
its foundation, one cannot deny the Bundeswehr’s contribution to peace and stability in 
its various so called out-of-area missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr 
has taken part in more than 20 constitutionally or parliamentary mandated major 
operations and a variety of smaller supporting missions with more than 10,000 soldiers 
on missions abroad at its peak in 2002.124  
With a Bundeswehr not even half as big as allowed by the German Treaty, the 
huge gap between the demands on Germany’s armed forces and the resources available 
became obvious even for the uninterested public. While German society according to 
former Federal President Horst Köhler used to meet the Bundeswehr with “friendly 
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disinterest,”125 the situation changed after the beginning of the Russian aggression in 
Ukraine beginning in the end of 2013. German society found itself split on the question 
of what to think of Russia, Putin, and the armed forces and more behind him. 
2. The German “Special Relationship” with Russia 
German-Russian relations date back more than 1,000 years, to a time when there 
were no “Russians” and “Germans” but merchants from East Francia and the Kievan Rus 
who established first ties by trading goods to their mutual benefit. Since then, Germany 
and Russia have shared a common history, ranging from cooperation to confrontation. 
The 1242 Battle on the Ice, when Prince Alexander Nevsky defeated the Teutonic 
Knights at the Estonian Lake Peipus, shaped German-Russian relations as did the import 
of German culture initiated by Tsar Peter the Great in the 17th century. Walter Laquer 
acknowledges the entanglement of both nations, stating that “culturally, the two nations 
were for many years nearer to each other than to any other country.”126 
The following section discusses the German “special relationship” to Russia, from 
the beginning of the Cold War, to West Germany’s Ostpolitik and finally to post-Cold 
War era, with Germany becoming a bridge between Europe and Russia. It describes a 
world out of joint, with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the Russian-puppeteered 
insurgency in eastern Ukraine, leading to a fundamental paradigm shift in German 
foreign policy. The tragedy of the failure of Germany’s policy of détente is evaluated, 
and the consequences of a German policy change are addressed. 
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a. The Imprint of the Cold War 
Memories of the mutual cruelties of German and Russian soldiers in World War 
II left deep scars on both sides.127 However, it was not only that burden of the past that 
shaped the Cold War relations between Germany and Russia, but even more the inability 
of the victors to establish a stable peace in Europe. Because Germany was divided in two 
under allied occupation following the war, Russian relations with the Germans had to 
reproduce that dichotomy. While West Germans were portrayed as Nazis, the East 
Germans in the eyes of the Soviets, were the “good Germans” who welcomed the Soviet 
occupation troops as their liberators and benefactors.128 
Persistent underlying fears of Germany that were a legacy of the war spurred the 
Soviet Union to go to great lengths to keep that memory alive through propaganda.129 
Since the FRG’s stated aim was to overcome the situation of a divided Germany, Stalin 
felt threatened by a German revanchism and therefore was eager to contain the situation 
by maintaining the status quo.130 Roland Smith mentions that “You look after your 
Germans and we’ll look after ours”131 was a famous remark Western journalists liked to 
put into Soviet mouths. It was the Soviet version of the Alliance’s purpose “to keep the 
Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”132 
With the two blocs formed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both heavily armed 
with nuclear and conventional weaponry, Germans on both sides realized that their home 
country would be the battleground of a potential third World War. Moreover, there would 
be German soldiers on both the opposing sides. Acknowledging that fact, the two 
Germanies competed with each other on the field of economics and quality of life, rather 
than provoking military action. While the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan helped to turn 
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West Germany into an economic miracle, East Germany was transformed into a loyal, 
dependent Soviet satellite state whose—mediocre at best—economy had to support the 
Soviet Union.133 
With the escalation of the Cold War sparking a series of crises (Suez Crisis, 1956; 
Berlin Crisis, 1961; Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; Prague Spring, 1968) Germans on both 
sides of the wall had nearly given up their hope to ever see a change in this gridlocked 
situation. 
b. German Ostpolitik—Change through Rapprochement 
In 1970, at the height of its power and with the Brezhnev Doctrine134 being in 
place, the Soviet Union felt military equal to the United States, bursting with self-
confidence and eager to embark on a variety of Third World adventures.135 With the 
Soviet satellites under control, Moscow felt ready to adjust its Westpolitik while still 
being the undisputed hegemon in Eastern Europe.  
Nevertheless, as Angela Stent points out, “the impetus for Soviet-West German 
détente came from Willy Brandt, the first postwar West German chancellor who was 
willing to recognize the European status quo.”136 As a necessary prerequisite Brandt had 
to convince Germany’s allies that it would be in their best interest to let him adopt this 
new course and that this would not affect the German loyalty to the West in any way.137 
He aimed for a normalization between the two German states without fully recognizing 
the GDR politically, thereby improving the situation on both sides of the wall. On the 
other side, the Soviets “hoped that West Germany would finally cease to be a revisionist 
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power, and hence would ratify the European status quo, thereby legitimizing their 
hegemony over Eastern Europe,”138 as Stent puts it. 
Brandt’s Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement) paved the 
ground to the Renunciation of Force Treaty between the Soviet Union and West 
Germany, which was signed on August 12, 1970.139 Both states agreed “to respect 
unconditionally the territorial integrity of all countries in Europe within their present 
borders” and “to refrain from threat or use of force.”140 Appended to the treaty was a 
letter from the German chancellor declaring that “this treaty does not stand in 
contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a 
state of peace in Europe, in which the German people regain their unity in free self-
determination.”141 
With the recognition of the status quo, détente and Ostpolitik broadened the 
spectrum of foreign policy options on both sides. The Soviets established commercial 
relations with West Germany, trading national resources against industrial technology.142 
With the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE – later OSCE) in 
1973 tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be reduced. Therefore, Stent 
argues “the rise and decline of détente with West Germany created the framework that 
determined how unification was achieved.”143 
c. Postwar Germany as a Bridge between Europe and Russia 
The German reunification, based on the Treaty on the Final Settlement with 
Respect to Germany,144 propelled Mikhail Gorbachev to near hero status among German 
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people, although it was clearly not his intention in the first place to allow an end to the 
two-state solution. 
In the light of its historical obligation, Germany’s self-perception today would be 
the one of a Zivilmacht using soft power as its most cherished tool of foreign policy. In 
the words of the German Federal Foreign Office, Annäherung durch Verflechtung 
(“rapprochement through economic interlocking”)145 was the new motto for engaging 
Russia after reunification.146 
Not everyone in Europe felt that comfortable with a reunited Germany. From a 
Polish perspective, Janusz Stefanowicz argues, “there is an indisputable correlation 
between the centuries-long division of Europe and the cooperative or rival, benign or 
malignant, mastery of Germany and Russia in Central Europe, if only they are strong 
enough to exert their power.”147 Or, as The Economist puts it, “When Germany and 
Russia warm each other, other states start to shiver.”148 Stefanowicz observes and is 
alarmed by a German deeply rooted Drang nach Osten (urge to the east) and the 
establishment of a special relationship with Russia.149 
On the contrary, more and more Germans consider Germany to be a post-heroic 
(pacifist) society, committed to values beyond the use of violence and military force.150 
Stressing the old and close relationship to Russia, German commercial, cultural, and 
political sectors argue in favor of a beneficial strategic partnership with Russia.151 An 
often observed fraternity among German and Russian political key figures like Helmut 
Kohl and Boris Yeltsin or Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin underlines the political 
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elite’s attempt to mutually influence favorable policy outcomes.152 Schröder, for 
example, who calls Putin a “flawless democrat,” has negotiated the construction of a gas 
pipeline under the Baltic Sea (and became chairman of the supervisory board of the 
Russian Rosneft oil company in 2017). Chancellor Merkel, Schröder’s successor, 
although not known to be a “bear-hugger” (Russian sympathizer) resisted any attempt 
from east European countries to revoke her predecessor’s decision.153 In an interview 
with the Wall Street Journal in 2007 she clearly stated that “the fact remains that we 
won’t be able to manage without Russian gas and oil in Europe, and we don’t want to 
either.”154 Germany, which by that point had become Russia’s largest partner in trade, 
often called for patience when Russia offended European countries and institutions or 
started saber-rattling. 
Horst Teltschik, former head of the Munich Security Conference, comments that 
“Putin will not be President forever. In Russia there are also many that think differently, 
even within his circle, who at this moment are silent because they see no chance to be 
heard. But that can change; the world does not remain still.”155 
3. Conflict in Crimea—a Pivotal Point in German Foreign and Security 
Policy 
In her 1999 book Russia And Germany Reborn, Stent stated that after the 
reunification of Germany, it would be Russia shaping European history in the next 
century.156 She predicted that Russia “will be a constant concern to its neighbors because 
of its potentially lethal combination of political instability … and difficulties in adjusting 
to the loss of empire.”157 Unfortunately, she ended up being right. 
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When in 2008 troops of Russia and the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia 
openly engaged with Georgian forces, accusing Georgia of being the aggressor, many 
German policy makers avoided a clear assignment of blame and called for maintaining 
the dialogue with Russia instead.158 This reticence changed as Russian forces continued 
their advancement into the Georgian heartlands. The Office of the Federal Chancellor 
unaccustomedly stated that this marked a caesura in Russian-German relations.159 
Nevertheless, in times of crises like these, Germans still preferred to speak with their 
Russian counterparts to find a solution that would not harm their hard-earned 
accomplishments.160 While the Russo-Georgian warthe first European war in the 21st 
centurywas perceived as a defining moment by most of Germany’s allies, it merely 
downgraded the German-Russian partnership from a strategic one to a “modernization 
partnership.”161 Chancellor Merkel, unwilling to offend Russia, rejected all calls for 
imposing sanctions on Russia. 
Germany’s attitude toward Russia fundamentally changed when, in the aftermath 
of the Euromaidan protests in Kiev and the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s 
administration, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and turned the Eastern 
Ukraine into a twilight battlefield. Using soldiers without insignias and an 
unconstitutional referendum, Russia not only created an area of permanent crisis but also 
a new and simultaneously old campaign to wage war; nowadays this is often referred to 
as hybrid warfare, but it is plainly revanchism via military desperados. Russia’s 
geopolitical moves clearly indicated that it has not yet arrived in the 21st century.162 Its 
thinking in spheres of influence, creating a ring of fire around its borders, turned out to be 
fundamentally incompatible with the European approach to modern security policy.  
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Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine has to be considered as a rejection of the 
whole post-Cold War security order that it helped to create and defend in the past.163 
That order was no longer satisfactory to a revanchist Russia, but it was also a 
manifestation of the Russian addiction to self-justification out a sense of inferiority to the 
West that has deep roots in an unhappy past.164 Taking a page from the diplomacy of the 
epoch after the Russo-Turkish war, where Petersburg felt slighted in the 1880s by 
Bismarck’s Berlin, Russia seemed to have decided that since the West supposedly 
refused to end the Cold War with Russia, the additional damage to the Russian reputation 
for invading the Ukraine in the international community seemed an acceptable price to 
pay for world recognition at the West’s expense. His gaining prestige at home, more than 
compensated Putin for being branded as an outcast by the international community. 
Germany, humiliated by having to admit its misjudgment about the prospects of a 
Russian integration into a peaceful European community, substantially changed its 
policy. Thomas Forsberg characterized this realignment as a shift from “Ostpolitik to 
Frostpolitik.”165 In 2016 Germany consistently initiated a comprehensive €130 billion 
($153 billion) program of military build-up to counter the Russian aggression and to 
reassure its allies of its rediscovered loyalty. 
B. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
With the publication of its 2016 white paper, the German Government and the 
Federal Ministry of Defense finally managed to revive the long silent security policy 
debate. Moreover, this was the first time that a German white paper was formally issued 
by the federal government and not only the Federal Ministry of Defense. For Defense 
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her critics. Therefore, she made sure that the 2016 white paper was “fostered by 
participation, contributions and critical suggestions from the worlds of politics, science 
and civil society, as well as from industry, the interested public, and international 
partners”166  
With an unsettled world in transition, “Germany’s security environment has 
become even more complex, volatile, dynamic and thus increasingly unpredictable.”167 
German society in the past often tended to ignore issues of foreign and security policy, 
but rapid globalization soon caused the borders between foreign and security policies to 
blur steadily and caught the attention of German society. In the media and political 
spheres the agenda has become dominated in particular by two main topics: the migration 
crisis and the interpretation of a reinvigorated Russia with its president Putin challenging 
the liberal world order. Those two issues seem to be closely interlinked in a strange and 
terrifying manner, mutually reinforcing each other. 
At the peak of the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016, with more the one million 
refugees seeking asylum in Germany (see Figure 4), the question of how to deal with this 
challengeespecially in the light of Germany’s burdensome historyled to a severe 
radicalization of the political spectrum at the fringes. Germany’s alt-right party 
Alternative für Deutschland (AFD – Alternative for Germany) unleashed a storm of 
popular interest and demanded closing the borders, shooting if necessary to defend them, 
deporting refugees to their home country, and reviving the German culturewhatever 
that meant. On the other side of the spectrum, the German party Die Linke (the left) 
assumed the opposite standpoint and declared all refugees welcome.  
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Figure 4.  Development of the Numbers of Applications for Asylum (1995-
2018)168 
 
Putin and the Russian state-controlled media supported both of these competing 
parties, invited their leading politicians with private jets to conspiratorial talks in 
Moscow, and incited hate between the different political tendencies and the German 
society as a whole.169 Putin, trying to drive a wedge among German society, the 
European nations, and Germany’s transatlantic partner was alarmingly successful. In a 
German opinion poll from May 2018, conducted by a publicly-regulated German 
television station, Putin was considered more than twice as reliable as Germany’s  
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international partner, the United States (Figure 5).170 In fact, 82 percent of those polled 
answered that in their opinion the United States is not a reliable partner anymore. This 
fundamental change in opinion can attributed to more than the “Trump effect.”  
Figure 5.  German Opinion Poll: United States No Longer a Reliable Partner171 
 
Harald Kujat, German retired four-star general, former Chief of Defense, and 
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, now even officially works for the Russian 
think tank “Dialogue of Civilizations” in the heart of Berlin. The organization is led by 
Putin’s intimate friend Wladimir Jakunin, who is on the sanctions list for his involvement 
in the Ukraine crisis.172 Putin’s information no longer relies solely on his online “troll 
factories” but has also found its way into the glamorous circles of diplomatic, political, 
and journalistic society. 
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The German party Die Linke made no secret of its intentions. On November 12, 
2015, in a plenary debate on the occasion of the Bundeswehr’s 60th anniversary, 
Wolfgang Gehrcke in his function as foreign policy spokesperson for Die Linke, 
demanded the abolition of the Bundeswehr with reference to the German-Russian 
relations.173 Additionally, he demanded to disband NATO and contribute the budget 
savings resulting from dismantling both organizations to the arriving refugees.174 In June 
2016 Die Linke reinforced its call for the abolition of NATO and proposed instead to 
establish a new system of collective security in Europe that would include Russia.175 
Meanwhile, the Bundeswehr had rescued more than 20,000 migrants in distress 
on the Mediterranean Sea, provided more than 51,000 accommodation facilities for 
refugees, offered reconstruction trainings for Syrian refugees, and in peak times had more 
than 9,000 soldiers and civilians detailed to work for refugee aid.176 The German left did 
not take notice; they were busy saving the world by organizing chains of beacons. 
The creeping disintegration of German society did not stop at the barracks gates 
of the Bundeswehr. Since 2017 the Military Counter Intelligence Agency has started to 
screen every recruit for extreme left-wing, right-wing, or Islamist tendencies.177 While 
the number of suspicions in principle is declining, some cases may give cause for 
concern. Since 2011, 89 right-wing extremists and 25 Islamists have been convicted. 
Among them was the case of second lieutenant Franco A., who is accused of having 
planned an assassination of high ranking politicians responsible forin his viewthe 
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failed refugee policy.178 He disguised himself successfully for several months as a Syrian 
refugee before he was unmasked. His case shocked the German public and started a 
debate about education and tradition in the Bundeswehr, the role and supervision of the 
Military Counter Intelligence Agency, and a possible failure of the Bundeswehr’s concept 
of citizens in uniform.  
C. BACK TO THE ROOTS: TRANSITION STEP BY STEP 
Despite the complexity of foreign and domestic issues since the Ukraine conflict 
and European migration crisis, the German Bundeswehr did not fall into a state of shock. 
On the contrary, it carried out the needed adjustments in an evolutionary approach, one 
step by another, resisting the politicians who often regarded major military reforms as 
simultaneously a panacea for all kinds of deficiencies and a monument to themselves. 
1. Masterplan or Management by Crisis? 
When Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen took over from her predecessor 
Thomas de Maizière, she announced the so-called Agenda Attraktivität (program to boost 
the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr) as the first initiative in her new job. It was a wise 
choice for two reasons. First, she had profound knowledge in that field of expertise from 
her last position as Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth. Second, it was undisputed across the whole political spectrum that the 
Reorientation of the Bundeswehr had caused a severe personnel problem. The situation at 
the recruitment front was miserable, the morale down after a series of permanent reforms 
and reforms of the reforms, equipment was limited and often not available because of 
missing spare parts and insufficient maintenance capacities. With that situation being no 
secret to the public and the politicians of all parties, even the opposition parties had to 
agree, that this was a necessary and highly reasonable step. Since von der Leyen’s 
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decision as such did not offer a target for critique, the opposition started to criticize the 
initiative’s implementation before it had even started.179 
Immediately, von der Leyen scored a big coup by engaging Dr. Katrin Suder, a 
director from McKinsey with a Ph.D. in physics and an expert on public sector practice, 
as her new state secretary responsible for armaments procurement, information 
technology, and planning. The Dresden Decree180 was altered to reflect the changes 
made in jurisdiction. The goal to radically overhaul the procurement processes, speed up 
the digitization process, and eliminate the maintenance jam of major weapon systems 
proved to be too ambitious. Von der Leyen and Suder soon found out that there was a lot 
of basic work to be done in order to get a well-grounded overview of the thousands of 
armaments, IT, and procurement programs, and their respective status.181 Military 
procurement projects are, in fact, “rocket science” and simply do not generate quick 
success and can hardly be hastened by force.  
During von der Leyen’s first term the German Bundestag approved procurements 
projects with a value of more than €32 billion ($38 billion), compared to €6 billion in the 
previous term.182 Furthermore, more than 66 procurement projects with a value of €75 
billion ($88 billion) have been transferred to active risk management.183 Even the 
opposition parties had to admit that Suder’s and von der Leyen’s endeavors to create 
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transparency in the military equipment sector have been exceedingly successful.184 The 
tragedy of Defense Minister von der Leyen’s tenure is that her efforts for transparency 
have made the multitude of sins committed against the Bundeswehr even more visible 
and risk recoiling on her own. Moreover, since armament procurements are often long-
term projects that require a substantial effort of planning, the credit for her successfully 
designed projects will likely be harvested by her successors. 
Exposed to risks and challenges from the Ukraine crisis, Russian aggression at 
NATO’s eastern flank, and drastically increasing threats from the cyber realm, von der 
Leyen took action and started adjustments that later became known as the “turnaround” 
of the Bundeswehr. On the basis of a security analysis in the 2016 white paper and a 
deficit analysis of the German armed forces capabilities, von der Leyen ordered an 
increase in the sustainability of the Bundeswehr by expanding its personnel strength, 
boosting its robustness and resilience, and establishing missing and new capabilities.185 
While it can be argued that von der Leyen’s adjustments of the Bundeswehr with 
a focus on public image enhancement, armament procurement, and a return to territorial 
defense with more robust forces was partially triggered by external factors, the actions 
taken clearly correspond with the actions necessary to repair the damage caused by the 
reorientation, as outlined in Chapter III.C. Thus, von der Leyen’s steps of reforming her 
predecessor’s reform were based on three pillars: image enhancement, equipment, and 
stopping the sellout of the Bundeswehr. Rather than a master plan, it may more 
appropriately be called an evolutionary approach of identifying the critical parameters 
and pulling the decisive levers to get the Bundeswehr back on track. In pursuing her 
program, von der Leyen could count on the support of Germany’s allies and especially 
NATO. 
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2. NATO Summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016 
The external pressure by NATO was not only an important but the decisive factor 
that put an end to Germany’s military restraint and initiated a defense turnaround in 2016. 
This policy led to Germany’s coming of age in terms of security policy and the state’s 
willingness to finally take responsibility in an out-of-joint world.  
In September 2014, the NATO member states met at the Wales summit, 
overshadowed by Russia’s ongoing aggression toward Ukraine and just before the 
completion of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. 
Would the Ukraine crisis revive NATO or rather make the NATO member states focus 
on national territorial defense, concerned about further resentments toward Russia? While 
the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) surely was an expected outcome aimed to reinforce 
NATO’s collective defense in the East particularly, the key question was a different 
one.186 Taking a page from the burden-sharing regime of the Cold War, would the 
NATO allies not only have the willingness to commit—again—to increase their defense 
spending to meet the alliance’s 2-percent gross domestic product (GDP) goal, but also act 
accordingly? 
The outcomes of the two NATO summits in Wales and Warsaw were—at least 
regarding Germany—substantially more significant than they may have appeared at first 
glance. Germany surprised not only most of its allies,187 but also its own civil society. At 
the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, Germany committed itself to take on more 
responsibility in the world and pledged considerably more funds and resources. 
Additionally, Germany pushed further to promote its Framework Nation concept in order 
to become an Anlehnungspartner, which has not only been commended by its allies, but 
“has been even referred to as ‘German self-therapy.’”188  
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Undoubtedly, the commitments made in Wales were a decisive step in the right 
direction; however, their effect was limited because they still lacked the proof of actual 
work. Looking from Wales toward the Warsaw summit, many analysts therefore 
postulated that NATO should “focus on implementing the deliverables announced at the 
Wales summit and, in so doing, building the long-term capabilities necessary to make the 
alliance more agile.”189 Ahead of the Warsaw summit in 2016, even Germany could no 
longer avoid acknowledging the consensus among the NATO allies that “Russia has left 
the European security order that was established after the Cold War and terminated its 
partnership with NATO.”190 Germany’s initial intention to act as a link between 
transatlantic as well as European security interests and Russia was no longer sustainable. 
The key challenge now was to provide to the East “a different kind of force, one that 
remains at a heightened state of readiness to be deployed within days, not months.”191 
Germany decided to deliver: After an in-depth analysis within the German 
government, in May 2016, current Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen announced an 
end to the period of military personnel reductions and restrictions, effective immediately. 
In a very first step, around 7,000 new military positions were to be established at short 
notice in accordance with NATO capability planning targets, while the overall need of up 
to 14,300 soldiers was officially stated.192 This point in time was not entirely chosen by 
chance; in fact, it was designed to turn rhetoric into action—just a few weeks before the 
next NATO summit in Poland. 
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At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 Germany renewed its commitment to 
NATO with specific promises to provide troops and to take over the lead by serving as a 
framework nation in the East. Moreover, Germany´s contributions would include: the 
willingness to take over a key role in the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
(VJTF); to provide troops on a rotational basis to NATO’s presence on the eastern flank; 
to participate regularly at important exercises; and to lead a multinational battalion in 
Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).193 Thus, following the 
NATO paradigm shift, Germany has made a considerable about-face from crisis 
management in out-of-area missions to deterrence and European territorial defense. 
3. Contribution to NATO 
Given Germany’s reticence in defense affairs and the role of war in public 
memory, its domestic limitations from a rather skeptical society and the present coalition 
agreement (which clearly forbade a reorganization of the Bundeswehr), the German 
decision to expand its military cannot only be explained by the level of multi-crises the 
world continues to face. To a greater degree, the pressure on Germany by its fellow 
NATO allies helped to initiate more than a military turnaround. It also brought about the 
understanding that the assured provision of security requires Germany to increase its 
contribution substantially, to assume more responsibility, and last but not least, to 
increase spending on defense. 
With its second cycle in the new personnel policy, the newly founded personnel 
committee of the Bundeswehr not only confirmed the chosen path of a military 
expansion, it pushed it even further. By granting an additional 5,000 soldiers to the 
different services and increasing the numbers for volunteers and soldiers of the reserve, 
Germany reinforced its willingness to become a major player in European and  
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transatlantic security.194 Moreover, the Bundeswehr personnel committee further aligned 
the German integrated planning process with the NATO Defense Planning Process 
(NDPP) and made sure, in particular, to always address the respective target packages set 
by the NATO capability requirements for Germany. As a result, the Bundeswehr 
concentrated, for instance, on establishing new cyber capabilities by creating a dedicated 
cyber service branch, strengthening its resilience, and reinforcing Germany’s 
contributions to the EFP and VJTF.195 
As Germany perpetually faces criticism for not complying with the NATO 2-
percent GDP spending goal, the German military expansion serves a welcome side effect. 
With current spending at not more than 1.19 percent of its GDP, a near-term increase to 2 
percent would require an amount of growth in spending that had the potential to severely 
unbalance the European defense architecture. One must keep in mind the historic 
relations of Germany to its neighbors as a result of the famed Deutsche Mittlelage. “The 
investment of € 130 billion [$153 billion] over a 15-year period, as requested by the 
defence minister, is therefore a fairly realistic figure.”196 
4. A Flexible Approach to Personnel Strength 
In May 2016, following the decisions made in the Wales summit in 2014 and in 
preparation for the Warsaw summit in July 2016, German Defense Minister Ursula von 
der Leyen announced the beginning of a military expansion. The announcement was 
characterized by a number of distinctive features.197 She promised to lift the strict 
personnel caps by implementing an atmender Personalkörper (literal translation: 
breathing body of personnel, meaning a workforce flexible in numbers), capable of 
flexible adjustment to the respective tasks the Bundeswehr would have to face in the 
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given situation. To fulfill the German commitments of the Wales summit, the 
Bundeswehr would need to increase its number of soldiers by the aforementioned 14,300 
by 2023, the German Defense Minister argued. Consequently, she ordered recruiting 
7,000 new soldiers immediately. 
From now on—as a standing procedure—a personnel committee, led by the two 
State Secretaries and the Chief of Defense of the Bundeswehr, would determine 
manpower requirements on an annual basis.198 Therefore, a planning and prognosis 
process would be created to justify these demands, even under scrutiny, and adjust the 
budget planning accordingly.199 In the second run of the process in 2017, the prognosis 
was updated again. The new target figure for 2024 was a total of 198,000 soldiers, 
including reserves, volunteers, and regulars (Figure 6). 
Figure 6.  Projected Size of the Armed Forces (Target Figures)200 
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To prevent the Bundeswehr’s services, commands, and organizational 
independent units from abusing this new personnel policy simply to fill vacancies and 
create eagerly longed for posts, a top-down approach with control mechanisms and 
distinct standards has been enforced. Every additional demand communicated by the 
armed service, in order to be approved, would require an authorization from the 
respective service chief of staff. Additionally, it would need to be benchmarked against a 
set of three guiding principles by contributing to an increase in sustainability, a 
strengthening of robustness, or the establishment of new capabilities. Last but not least, a 
cross-check to prevent the creation of any avoidable redundancy with NATO allies must 
be carried out. 
5. Cyber and Other Decisive “Small Things”  
In order to move from rhetoric to action, von der Leyen started to put her agenda-
policies into practice. In May 2015, severe hacker attacks on the German Bundestag 
resulted in large-scale data theft and the need to replace the entire Bundestag’s IT 
network. When the attacks were revealed to the public, von der Leyen without hesitation 
decided to make a major step forward.201 Since the Bundeswehr, which was not affected 
by this particular attack, has to repel more than 4,500 cyberattacks per day, she 
announced the implementation of a new cyber branch. Its target structure would 
compromise 14,000 soldiers and civilian experts—a force nearly as big as the German 
Navy.202 This new military branch would consolidate the Bundeswehr’s former scattered 
competencies in the field of IT and network security, augment new capabilities, and thus 
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enable the forces to effectively counter cyberattacks and, if necessary, wage cyber 
wars.203 
In reaction to the case of army officer Franco A. and other incidents associated 
with growing right-wing extremism as well as Islamism in the Bundeswehr, von der 
Leyen in May 2017 decided to change the subordination of the Military Counter 
Intelligence Agency (MAD—Militärischer Abschirmdienst).204 The MAD, formerly an 
appendix of a lower authority to the German Joint Support Service Command, now 
became directly subordinated to the Federal Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the 
Zentrum Innere Führung (the German Leadership Development and Civic Education 
Centre of the Bundeswehr) also became directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense 
in order to underline the importance of civic education in fighting extremism and to 
revive the concept of the citizen in uniform to strengthen the soldier’s resilience against 
harmful influences.205 Along similar lines, the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr 
(Armed Forces Leadership Academy—the Bundeswehr’s highest-level educational 
institution and joint staff college) shared the same fate and demonstrated the willingness 
of von der Leyen’s administration to declare proper education, ethos, and mindset a 
management issue. 
Minister von der Leyen’s actions, aimed at improving the political education of 
the Bundeswehr’s soldiers, also raised criticism since she had accused “Germany’s armed 
forces, the Bundeswehr, of having an ‘attitude and leadership problem’ on German 
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TV”206 in April 2017, after the news of potential misconduct by German soldiers. 
Although she immediately apologized for her statement and expressed her sincere 
appreciation for their soldier’s performance, this episode once again showed that the 
relationship between Minister von der Leyen and her troops was not characterized by 
deep sympathy, as was the case with one of her predecessors, Peter Struck. Instead, she 
preferred to rule the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defense with an iron grip 
and concentrated on what she considered her chief task, to reconstitute the Bundeswehr to 
a state of full operational capability.  
Tragically, it turns out that despite all the valid efforts, the military turnaround 
will take considerably more time than expected; of all things, Germany’s excellent 
economic situation coupled with the demographic situation and competition for talented 
people, has hindered the recruitment of additional staff. 
                                                 
206 Deutsche Welle, “German Defense Minister Ursula von Der Leyen at a Crossroads | DW | 




The goal of this thesis was not to give a detailed and comprehensive historical 
overview of Germany and its armed forces, or Russia’s grand strategy after World War 
II, or the Crimean conflict. Instead, it aimed to depict the mechanisms of military 
transformation, apply them to the German case, and on that basis, tease out the 
ramifications for the European security architecture from a German perspective.  
This final chapter provides a summary to the reader: it addresses questions for 
further research, draws conclusions from the analysis provided based on the analytical 
framework provided in Chapter II, and gives a strategic outlook for the possible future 
development of the German Bundeswehr. 
A. SUMMARY 
Throughout history armed forces have constantly been reformed, realigned, or 
reorganized in order to adjust to a changing strategic and operational environment; to 
improve their effectiveness and efficiency; and to keep up with progress, innovation, and 
disruptive technologies. Organization theory offers the possibility to approach the 
analysis of military transformation on the basis of an analytical framework by looking on 
organizations as open systems. Using that theoretical structure, we can identify policy  as 
the sole driver for military transition, which then manifests in all organizational 
dimensions (strategy, culture, structure, and processes). 
The German Bundeswehr, bearing the unique burden of a difficult heritage of 
Nazi Germany’s severe crimes against humanity, has worked hard to earn respect and 
renown as a peaceful member within the systems of collective defense committed to 
defend the liberal world order. Still reluctant to use military force, Germany honors its 
international commitment that “only peace will emanate from German soil.”207 
                                                 
207 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 4. 
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With its 2011 military reform, the so-called Reorientation of the Bundeswehr, 
Germany intended to suspend conscription and streamline command structures, as well as 
to professionalize and modernize defense procurement and human resource management. 
In the midst of a severe debt crisis and in a state of reform fatigue, this highly ambitious 
reform led to a severe overload for the Bundeswehr and its civilian as well as military 
personnel. In light of the worsening post-2014 security policy situation, the German 
military faced a huge gap between the resulting demands on the armed forces and the 
resources available. 
From Ostpolitik to rapprochement Germany’s foreign policy toward Russia 
became interlocked with its economic policy, which was shaped by a deep sense of 
mutual understanding of the mistakes made on both sides. Gratefulness for reunification 
and the sincere belief in Germany’s own ability to successfully promote the integration of 
Russia into the European community made Germany blind to the true face of Russia and 
deaf to the warnings of its allies, from Eastern Europe particularly. 
Because Germany’s armed forces were established to counter the Russian 
aggression in the first place and then constantly reduced after reunification and the end of 
the Cold War, they can be regarded as an indicator of the Russian threat-level. Following 
this hypothesis, it can be argued that the perceived Russian threat from a German 
perspective has significantly increased due to the Ukraine crisis. It has led to the 
unfolding of a third pivotal point in recent European history and to a reputedly pacifist 
nation like Germany significantly changing its foreign and security policies.  
Germany cut its close ties to Russia and subscribed to the European skepticism 
toward Moscow. Moreover, the Russian aggression was the final push necessary to kick 
off the process of increasing the number of German soldiers for the first time since the 
late Cold War, which was contrary to societal expectations shaped by the historical 
behavior of the German armed forces. In May 2016, the German government approved 
an about-face in its military personnel policy, lifting personnel caps and thus allowing the 
Bundeswehr to increase its operational power and strengthen its robustness, and to 
establish new capabilities as part of a comprehensive €130 billion ($153 billion) program 
of military build-up. 
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B. QUO VADIS BUNDESWEHR? 
It has been proven that an analytical framework based on organization and open 
systems theory can explain the reasons behind the political fascination with reorganizing. 
Not only is it difficult to avoid the temptation to use the military for decisive actions, but 
also for appearances on the political stage. And while it is often very easy to give the 
correct diagnosis, it is harder to provide the appropriate therapy—particularly when one’s 
own tenure is limited and the planning for the reform takes half of it. 
To understand why the reorientation turned into a disaster it is necessary to take 
the context of this specific reform into account. It is reasonable to assume that only the 
brightest minds of the German Federal Ministry of Defense were in charge of planning, 
implementing, and evaluating the reform. The idea of modernizing and digitizing the 
cumbersome forces also was as brave as it was right. Nevertheless, the conditions set by 
the fiscal restraints have drastically overshot the mark, especially since transformation 
processes usually result in substantial costs in the beginning and achieve their returns 
only after the implementation and transition phases. In the German case, the political 
decision of the government—and not only the one of poor Minister de Maizière—was the 
source of all misfortune. On top of it all, the massive reform fatigue in German society 
and the Bundeswehr contributed to the failure of this overambitious reform.  
Who bears the responsibility then? It is the German Bundestag, German 
politicians, and the German people themselves, who in times of crisis shortsightedly 
sacrificed the nation’s long-range security in favor of quick money. However, it has to be 
admitted, this unfortunate line of action was at all times in accordance with the German 
Basic law, which states that “the Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of 
defence. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure must be shown in 
the budget.”208 Germany’s failure should serve as an example of what not to do for all 
politicians tempted to reorganize and reduce their militaries for short-term savings or 
their own political success. As the German case demonstrates, the savings achieved (€4 
                                                 
208 Federal Republic of Germany, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” trans. Christian 
Tomuschat and David P. Currie, May 23, 1949, Article 87a (1), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf. 
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to €5 billion, or $6 billion) did not even come close to the expectations of its creators. 
The reconstruction of the Bundeswehr on the other side will amount to a sum in three-
digit billions—not to mention the loss the Bundeswehr soldiers’ trust. 
It is arguable whether the planners of the reorganization neglected to properly 
assess the security policy situation. If they did, they were in good company. After all, 
Condoleezza Rice’s 1997 dictum was still the valid doctrine on both sides of the Atlantic: 
“Worries may persist that Russia is bent on reconstructing its empire, but there is little 
concern that it will be a menacing military power on the continent any time soon.”209 
Although Defense Minister von der Leyen is not exempt from criticism, it is to 
her credit that she resisted the temptation of leading the Bundeswehr in the next big 
reform of the reform again. Instead, she chose cautiously to realign the German armed 
forces exactly at those points that promised to heal the biggest wounds of the 
reorientation—personnel, public image, defense procurement, sustainability, and 
robustness. In avoiding large-scale reform, she also escaped the usual stationing debate 
that pops up with every fundamental military reform. As politicians tend to rediscover 
their long-lost love for the Bundeswehr when it comes to dismantling the barracks in their 
own constituency, this process often leads to sub-optimal decisions based on political 
interests rather than military necessities.  
Therefore, it can be argued that von der Leyen’s organic, evolutionary approach 
to military realignment is a favorable one that can indeed serve as a positive example in 
the transition of military forces. At least, von der Leyen broke the vicious circle of a 
Bundeswehr “condemned forever to becoming and never to being.”210 Additionally, 
while de Maizière’s reorganization was widely criticized due to its misguided basic 
assumption and approach, von der Leyen’s turnaround is criticized mostly because its 
implementation has not been fast enough. Thus, the fundamental difference between 
these reforms emerges: one being widely opposed, and the other eagerly awaited.  
                                                 
209 Philip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft, Reprint ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 370. 
210 Dyson, “Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being’? The Weise Commission and 
German Military Isomorphism,” 545. 
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From the perspective of foreign and security policies, it is an ironic twist that the 
Russian aggression in the Ukraine has achieved the exact opposite of its original 
intention. Instead of driving a wedge between the European allies it revived the spirit of 
the already written-off EDC and sparked the deepening of the European cooperation in 
terms of a permanent structured cooperation. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has led to 
more than the unfolding of a third pivotal point in the recent history of the European 
security architecture and to a fundamental realignment of Germany’s security policy. It 
can also be seen as a spark to a revitalization of the idea of a European Defense 
Community and the potential birth of a European army. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, three factors particularly can be identified 
that led to this turning point in recent history, putting an end to Germany’s military 
restraint and initiating a military turnaround in 2016. These factors are a situation of 
crises and conflicts in an “out of joint” world, an objectively failed attempt to reorganize 
the Bundeswehr, and rising external pressure on Germany by its fellow NATO allies. 
While the reorientation of the Bundeswehr and the constantly deteriorating security 
situation served as catalysts increasing the gap between demands and resources available, 
it was NATO’s influencesome might even say gentle pressurethat truly paved the 
way for a German military expansion.  
This comprehensive €130 billion ($153 billion) program of military build-up with 
a new personnel policy at its very core does not only show characteristics of a repair, 
reorganization, or rearmament, but it represents the coming of age in terms of security 
and defense policy. The sheer fact that none of the NATO allied member states objected 
to this military expansion emphasizes the level of trust that Germany has gained by 
serving as a reliable, sometimes reluctant, yet always predictable partner. Its willingness 
to assume reasonable responsibility and therefore to increase its defense capability in 
close coordination with NATO via the NDPP underlines not only the sincerity of 
Germany’s proceedings but also its reason of stateto refrain from any attempt of 
independent operations or to unbalance the European (and thus the transatlantic) defense 
architecture.  
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The defined goal of preventing any further redundancies between Germany and 
its neighbors in terms of military capabilities could in fact blaze the trail for a future 
European Army.211 Pointing to the history of the creation of the Bundeswehr, as 
described in Chapter II, this idea is far from absurd, but has to be subject to further in-
depth research. In the end, it all comes down to Allison Smale’s succinct conclusion that 
“you know times have changed when the Germans announce they are expanding their 




                                                 
211 See for instance the German Framework Nation Concept or the initiative to establish a European 
Air Transport Command. 
212 Alison Smale, “In a Reversal, Germany’s Military Growth Is Met with Western Relief,” New York 
Times, June 5, 2016, sec. Europe, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/europe/european-union-
germany-army.html. 
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APPENDIX.  THE “DRESDEN DECREE” 
Bundesminister der Verteidigung, “Grundsätze für die Spitzengliederung und 
Führungsorganisation im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung und der Bundeswehr 
(Dresdner Erlass) [Principles for the Top-Level Structure, Chain of Command, and 
Command and Control Organization in the Federal Ministry of Defence and the 
Bundeswehr (Dresden Decree)].”213 
 
                                                 
213 Taken from: Federal Ministry of Defence, “The Reorientation Of The Bundeswehr - Safeguarding 
National Interests – Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together,” trans. Federal 
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